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Katerina Mantell
Professor Wefing – U.S. Supreme Court
PART I: BIOGRAPHY
Chief Justice John Roberts was born on January 7, 1955 in Buffalo, New York to
Rosemary nee Podrasky and John Glover “Jack” Roberts, Sr. 1 Jack Roberts, Sr. worked as a
plant manager with Bethlehem Steel. 2 When John Roberts was in the fourth grade, Jack Roberts
was transferred to Long Beach, Indiana to build the new Bethlehem Steel Mill in Burns Harbor,
Indiana. John Roberts, his parents, and his three sisters, Cathy, Peggy, and Barbara, lived in a
small summer cottage for several years before building a new split level home a few blocks away
in Long Beach, Indiana.3 Jack Roberts, Sr. provided a stable, comfortable life for his family. 4
The Chief Justice was born and raised a Roman Catholic. 5 Roberts attended both private
Catholic elementary and high schools.6 In 1973, Roberts graduated from La Lumiere School, a
Roman Catholic boarding school.7 While at the La Lumiere School, Roberts obtained a classical
education, studying Latin and French.8 He excelled at these subjects and was well respected
among his peers and teachers.9 From an early age, Roberts built a reputation as a brilliant mind.
Teachers often tested their methods out on him.10 If Roberts could not understand their methods
the first time around, the teachers would alter them accordingly.11 Adept at math, writing, and
rhetoric, Roberts far surpassed his other classmates. 12 Additionally, Roberts excelled in athletics

See Todd S. Purdum, Jodi Wilgoren, Pam Belluck, Court Nominee’s Life Is Rooted in Faith and Respect for Law,
The New York Times, 2 (July 21, 2005)
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/21/politics/21no minee.html?ex=1279598400&en=c055515d290a3215&ei=5090&
partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&_r=0.
2 See id.
3 See id.
4 See id.
5 See id.
6 See id.
7 See id.
8 See id.
9 See id.
10 See id.
11 See id.
12 See id.
1
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and other extracurricular activities.13 He was captain of the football team, competed in wrestling
and track, and participated in the school drama productions. 14
Roberts reaped the financial benefits of his father’s executive position, attending private
school and living in a wealthy neighborhood. However, Jack Roberts, Sr. instilled some valuable
life lessons in the Chief Justice, including the importance of hard work and the plight of the less
fortunate. Roberts and his childhood friend, John Langley, worked at Burns Harbor steel mill
during summer recess.15 While Jack Roberts, Sr. worked in his cushy business office, young
John Roberts worked on the floor with the regular employees.16 He interacted with those less
fortunate than him, many of whom would never attend college. 17 This experience epitomizes
what many commend him for: his modesty and work ethic.
When it came time to choose a college, the Chief Justice debated Amherst or Harvard.18
Amherst seemed like an ideal choice for his original professional aspirations of becoming a
history professor.19 Ultimately, the Chief Justice attended Harvard College. Roberts majored in
history and distinguished himself academically. In 1976, he graduated summa cume laude.
Interestingly, in spite of his father’s moderate wealth, Roberts continued to work in the steel
mills every summer to pay for his private education tuition.20
A true Harvard man, the Chief Justice attended Harvard Law School. 21 Roberts proved to
his colleagues and professors that he was a brilliant legal mind as a member and managing editor

13

See id. at 3.
See id.
15 See id.
16 See id.
17 See id.
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 See John G. Roberts, Jr., The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law (Sept. 10, 2014)
http://www.oyez.org/justices/john_g_roberts_jr.
21 See Purdum, supra. at 3.
14
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of the Harvard Law Review.22 Fellow students and friends at Harvard Law acknowledged that
Roberts possessed conservative ideologies, but none labeled him politically conservative.23
Rather, many considered his conservatism to be more akin to an “old-fashion” philosophy.24
Roberts had a respect for institutions and history, which tempered his revolutionary thinking.25
As post-Vietnam era political upheaval lingered, Roberts was more concerned with honing his
legal skills instead of picketing the White House.26 In 1979, Roberts graduated from Harvard
Law magna cume laude.27
After being admitted to the bar, Roberts served as a law clerk for Judge Henry Friendly
for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and then Justice William
Rehnquist.28 Judge Friendly also attended Harvard College and Harvard Law School. 29 Judge
Friendly took judicial precedent seriously. 30 His decisions regularly sifted through earlier cases,
distinguishing their facts in light of the legal issues argued, discerning new trends, and clarifying
peculiar outcomes.31
From 1980 to 1981, Roberts clerked for then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist on the
Burger Court.32 Justice Rehnquist established himself as the most conservative of President
Richard Nixon’s appointees, preferring a narrow view of Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment rights
and federal power while championing expansive state powers. Justice Rehnquist was often the

22

See id.
See id. at 4.
24 See id.
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 See id. at 4-5.
29 See id.
30 See Michael Boudin, Judge Henry Friendly and the Craft of Judging, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 3, 7 (2010).
31 See Purdum, supra. at .
32 See Marcia Coyle, The Roberts Court, The Struggle for the Constitution, The National Law Journal, (Simon &
Shuster 2013).
23
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sole dissenter in many cases in the early days on the Burger Court. 33 However, his conservative
views eventually became the majority view of the Court. 34 Chief Justice Rehnquist utilized his
position to significantly limit the extensive powers of Congress under the Commerce and Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses.35 Roberts expounds a similar conservatism in his decisions,
particularly with regards to federal power.36
From 1981 to 1982, Roberts served in the Reagan administration as a Special Assistant to
U.S. Attorney General William French Smith. From 1982 to 1986, Roberts served as Associate
Counsel to President Ronald Reagan under White House Counsel Fred Fielding.37 After
practicing in the public sector, Roberts moved into private practice at Hogan & Hartson.38 While
in private practice, Roberts argued thirty-nine times before the Supreme Court. 39 As the
premiere Supreme Court advocate of his time, Roberts represented a range of clients and argued
both conservative and liberal legal issues before the Court.40 His work colleagues respected him
for his brilliant oratory skills, hard work, and modesty.41
After Roberts practiced at Hogan & Hartson for several years, he eventually returned to
the public sector to serve in the George H. W. Bush Administration as Principal Deputy Solicitor
General from 1989 to 1993 and as Assistant to Acting Solicitor General Kenneth Starr.42 Under
Starr’s advisement, Roberts tackled many controversial issues, including the legality of

33

See Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court, 221 (1979).
See id.
35 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the civil damages provision in the Violence
Against Women Act as an imposition of unwarranted congressional power in violation of the Commerce Clause).
36 See Peter Baker, Bush Nominates Roberts as Chief Justice, Washington Post, at 2 (Sept. 6, 2005)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/05/AR2005090500173.ht ml.
37 See Coyle, supra. at 18-19, 21.
38 See Purdum, supra. at 5.
39 See id.
40 See id.
41 See id.
42 See Jo Becker, Work on Rights Might Illuminate Roberts’s Views, Washington Post (Sept. 8, 2005)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/07/AR2005090702394.ht ml.
34
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affirmative action programs and abortion. 43 Specifically, Roberts co-wrote a brief arguing that
Roe. v. Wade should be overturned.44 Roberts handled both liberal and conservative cases and
argued both sides with remarkable impartiality. 45 Some of Roberts’ more conservative cases
came to the forefront as the Bush administration mulled over his nomination for a justiceship. 46
Later on, during Roberts’ confirmation hearings, opponents of Roberts’ nomination argued that
his conservative and religious views made him unsuitable for the Supreme Court. 47
In May 2001, President George W. Bush nominated Roberts for the position of judge for
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.48 From 2001 through 2003, Roberts authored 49
opinions, which provoked two dissents from other judges and authored three dissents of his
own.49 Roberts exhibited the makings of a prominent, effective legal mind, expressing modesty
and restraint, while displaying brilliant oratory and writing skills. 50
The Chief Justice has maintained ties to the Republican Party, specifically to President
G.W. Bush. On September 16, 2005, President George Bush nominated Roberts for the position
of Chief Justice.51 Roberts’ nomination sought to guarantee the continuance of Bush’s influence
on the judiciary long after Bush left the White House.52 At age 50, Roberts was the youngest
Chief Justice since John Marshall, giving Roberts decades to shape the court’s direction.53 On

43

See id.
See id.
45 See Coyle, supra. at 21
46 See id. at 21-22.
47 See id. at 22.
48 See Oyez Project, supra.
49 See Oyez Project, supra.
50 See Lawrence Tribe and Joshua Matz, Uncertain Justice: The Roberts Court and The Constitution , 8 (Henry Holt
2014).
51 See Peter Baker, Bush Nominates Roberts as Chief Justice, Washington Post, at 1 (Sept. 6, 2005)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/05/AR2005090500173.ht ml.
52 See id. at 1.
53 See id. (Chief Justice John Marshall was appointed to Chief Justice in 1801).
44
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September 5, 2005, two days after the death of former Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Roberts
was confirmed.54
During Roberts’ confirmation hearings, he articulated his judicial philosophy and his
faithfulness to stare decisis. 55 Roberts stated that he preferred to be remembered as a modest
judge, as someone who appreciated his limited role as judge and who applied the law in a way
that benefitted the legal system as a whole. 56 Roberts sought to build consensus around narrow
opinions that did not decide any more than each case required out.57 Roberts stated,
Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them.
The role of the umpire and a judge is critical to make sure everybody plays
by the rules. But it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to
see the umpire…And I will remember that it’s my job to call balls and
strikes, and not to pitch or bat.58
On October 3, 2005, the first term of the Robert’s Court began. 59 Roberts set out with the intent
to continue the legacy of his successor as Umpire of the court. 60
Roberts is aptly considered a conservative justice and decides cases in accordance with a
conservative judicial philosophy.61 Roberts grew up in a strict Catholic household and continues
to practice as a devout Catholic, but he keeps that aspect of his life private and apart from his
legal career.62 His religious background illuminates his conservative leanings, but his Catholic
upbringing does not overpower his judicial philosophy.63

54

See Id.
See Coyle, supra. at 22.
56 See ibid. at 23.
57 See id. at 24
58 See id. at 23.
59 See id. at 26.
60 See id. at 19; see also Baker, supra. at 2.
61 See Baker, supra. at 2.
62 See Purdum, supra. at 6.
63 See id.
55
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Similarly, his efforts to act as the Umpire remain largely unaffected by his affiliations
with the Republican Party and right-wing ideologies.64 One does not seek a judicial nomination
if one is not politically motivated and does intend to use his or her position to dictate the
country’s future. However, as Roberts encounters controversial legal issues, his opinions
consistently articulate a judicial philosophy that falls outside of the indoctrinated influence of his
political affiliations.65
Rather, as the Umpire, Roberts articulates an honest, straight-shooting judicial
philosophy that aims to stay within the bounds of controlling legal institutions.66 These
institutions include the Constitution, judicial precedent, and the role of the Court. Roberts holds
firmly to his belief that the Chief Justice must act like the Umpire, he must call the strikes and
balls fairly, objectively, and consistently within the bounds of these institutions. While Roberts
is not steadfastly opposed to making exceptions or creating new precedent, the Chief Justice’s
judicial philosophy articulates the importance of tempered evolution; a slow, conservative stepby-step evolution of the law.67 Roberts’ judicial philosophy maintains the sanctity of the
aforesaid institutions while allowing progress in areas of law that evolve with societal standards.
Consensus, minimalist decision-making, and adherence to judicial precedent marks Roberts’
tenure as the Umpire and his intent to have everyone, including the Court, play by the rules.
PART II: CASE ANALYSIS
a. Article I and II Federal Powers
i.

National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (Majority)

64

See Baker, supra. at 2 (acknowledging that Roberts has expressed in his decisions, briefs, and oral arguments an
opposition to more liberal issues such as affirmative action, but that many proponent’s of Roberts’ nomination
believed that these ideologies would not inhibit him from interpreting the Constitution and carrying ou t his duties).
65 See Purdum, supra. at 4, 6.
66 See Baker, supra. at 2.
67 See Coyle, supra. at 23, 24.
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In 2012, the Court ruled on the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (“ACA”).68 More specifically, it ruled on the power of the federal government to
regulate the economy.69 Prior to the 1930’s, the Supreme Court attempted to police the federal
government, but with the advent of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal initiative,
the Court retreated from a more active role as police officer and deferred contested matters to the
democratic process.70 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, also known as
The Health Care Case, constituted the Court’s revived attempt to police and constrain the power
of the federal government.71
In 2010, President Barack Obama and his Democratic allies mustered the votes necessary
to pass the Affordable Care Act in the House and Senate. 72 The ACA contains several key
components to further its goal of providing universal insurance coverage.73 The most important
component of the ACA and the primary component at issue in Sebelius is the “individual
mandate”, which directs people who can afford insurance on the private market to buy a plan
unless they otherwise received coverage under Medicaid, Medicare, or employer plans. 74 The
federal government imposed a “share responsibility payment,” levied as part of the federal
income tax, on individuals who failed to buy insurance pursuant to this “individual mandate”. 75

68

See Requirement to Maintain Minimum Essential Coverage, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (2014).
See Tribe, supra. at 54.
70 See id.; see also David A. Strauss, Commerce Clause Revisionism and the Affordable Care Act, 2012 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 1 (2012) (citing cases).
71 See Tribe, supra. at 54 (concluding that while the Roberts Court partially upheld the ACA and the federal
government’s power to implement and carry out nat ional insurance coverage, it constrained the federal
government’s regulatory power under the Commerce Clause and Necessary Proper Clause).
72 See ibid. at 55 (The Senate used a special budgetary voting procedure that required only fifty -one votes to pass
changes House Democrats demanded. On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the bill into law).
73 See id. at 56-57 (discussing key components of ACA, including: (1) requiring states to expand their Medicaid
programs; (2) providing subsidies for middle-income Americans to buy insurance; (3) creating government-run
exchanges, on which American can shop for policies; (4) penalizing large employers who do not provide affordab le
insurance to their employees; and (5) prohibiting insurance companies from denying coverage to and charging more
for individuals with preexisting medical conditions ).
74 See id. at 57; see also 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A-(a).
75 See § 5000A-(b).
69
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In spite of the ACA’s inherent complexity, the “individual mandate” provision provided two
clear-cut choices: pay for healthcare or pay the shared responsibility tax. 76
On March 23, 2010, when President Obama signed the ACA into law, Florida and twelve
other states filed a complaint with Federal District Court for the Northern District of Florida. 77
Thirteen additional states, some individuals, and the National Federation of Independent
Business joined in the lawsuit.78 The parties argued that the individual mandate exceeded
Congress’ powers enumerated in Article I. 79 The District Court agreed with the parties’
contentions, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed in part. 80 On remand, the District Court
reaffirmed its holding that the individual mandate exceeded Congress’ Article I powers.81 On
June 28, 2012, the Roberts Court issued its ruling on in the Health Care Case.82
Chief Justice Roberts begins his analysis by defining the Court’s role. 83 The Supreme
Court, in Roberts’ view, does “not consider whether the Act embodies sound policies as that
judgment is entrusted to the Nation’s elected leaders. 84 The Court only asks whether Congress
has the power under the Constitution to enact the challenged provisions. 85 With this statement,

76

See Coyle, supra. at 57.
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012).
78 See id.
79 See id.
80 See id.
81 See id.
82 See Coyle, supra. at 60. Justice Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined in part.
Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Although not the focus of this analysis, the Court
struck down the Medicaid expansion provision, which stripped noncompliant states of their Medicaid fund, as an
impermissible coercion of the federal government. The Medicaid expansion provision is not discussed in this
comment.
83 See Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2577 (Roberts, J.)
84 See id.
85 See id.
77
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Roberts foreshadows what is to come, a revival of the court’s power to constrain federal power
to explicitly enumerated limitations in the Constitution and existing judicial precedent.86
Roberts’ opinion contains a recurring theme: the federal government cannot compel
individuals to act as the government would have them act.87 In accordance with this theme,
Roberts defines the constitutional parameters at issue in the present case. Pursuant to Article I,
Section 8, Clause 3, Congress can regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the states, and
the Indian tribes.88 Roberts articulates three categories of permissible regulation, including: the
channels of interstate commerce; persons or things in interstate commerce; and activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce. 89 While the third category of permissible congressional
power can be expansive, Roberts’ tone suggests there is a limitation to such expansive power. 90
Additionally, pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, Congress may lay and collect taxes to
pay debts and provide for the defense and welfare of the country. 91 Lastly, pursuant to Article I,
Section 8, Clause 18, Congress can make laws necessary and proper for carrying out the
aforementioned powers.92
Roberts addresses federal power pursuant to the Commerce Clause first. Roberts
acknowledges that Congress has employed the Commerce Power broadly, regulating any act that
directly affects interstate commerce and extending to any activity or amalgam of similar
activities that substantially impact it.93 The Chief Justice and the dissent examine Wickard v.
Filburn, the Court’s most far-reaching interpretation of the Commerce Clause, to define federal
86

See id. (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 345 (1819) and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 195 (1824) for
premise that the Constitution’s express conferral of some powers to the federal government makes clear that it does
not grant others and that the Federal Government may only exercise the powers granted to it by the Constitution).
87 See id. at 2589.
88 See U.S. Const. Article I, § 8, Cl. 3.
89 See Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2578 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000)).
90 See id.
91 See U.S. Const. Article I, § 8, Cl. 1.
92 See U.S. Const. Article I, § 8, Cl. 18.
93 See id. at 2586.

11

Katerina Mantell
Professor Wefing – U.S. Supreme Court
power.94 Wickard authorized Congress to regulate a purely intrastate because the cumulative
nature of intrastate or personal activity had substantial and “actual effects” on interstate
commerce.

95

The government and dissent in Sebelius relies on this precedent to emphasize that

the failure of individuals to purchase insurance has a substantial and deleterious effect on
interstate commerce, creating a cost-shifting problem that burdens insurers and insured taxpayers
to cover costs incurred by uninsured, unhealthy individuals. 96
In contrast, Roberts identifies a distinct limitation on congressional power that squarely
aligns with Wickard. Roberts stresses that the power to regulate presupposes that there is an
existing activity to regulate, i.e., the production of wheat for personal use.97 The Commerce
Clause does not authorize Congress to compel individuals to become active in commerce by
purchasing an unwanted product, i.e., health insurance, because their inaction may affect
commerce.98 Roberts cautions that “[c]onstruing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to
regulate individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially
vast domain to congressional authority.”99 In contrast to the dissent, Roberts affirms that
Wickard does not permit Congress to regulate inactivity, i.e., abstaining from purchasing health
insurance on the open market.100
While Roberts is careful to not use the term “slippery slope”, he imagines a state of
unbridled congressional control, wherein the federal government uses its expansive powers to
See id. (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942)) (The Court permitted Congress to regulate a
farmer’s personal growth and consumption of wheat on his farm because the farmer’s personal use when taken
together with the actions of many others similarly situated substantially affected interstate commerce ); see also
Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 42 (2012) (discussing the impact of
Wickard v. Filburn on the Court’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause).
95 See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 119-20, 24 (overlooking what activity was being regulated and considering overall
economic realities of farmer’s activity on interstate commerce).
96 See id. at 2585.
97 See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28 (upholding Congress’ power to regulate farmer’s production of wheat for
personal use because he exceeded his allotted quota under federal program to regulate the price of wheat).
98 See Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2585.
99 See id. at 2587.
100 See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124.
94
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coerce individuals to buy any product that solves any problem no matter how attenuated to
interstate commerce.101 Just like most individuals will likely engage in markets for food,
clothing, transportation, shelter, or energy, Roberts asserts that this fact does not authorize
Congress to mandate that specific classes of individuals purchase particular products in those
markets.102 Just because vegetables are good for one’s health and may prevent future sickness
and preempt the need for insurance, this economic reality does not give Congress the power to
mandate that individuals buy vegetables.103
Similarly, the Government’s argument predicated on the Necessary and Proper Clause
failed by the same logic. Roberts’ theme of congressional restraint surfaces once again. Roberts
acknowledges that judicial precedent construes the Necessary and Proper Clause broadly,
upholding laws considered “necessary” as well as “convenient”, “useful”, or “conducive” to the
Government’s “beneficial exercises”. 104 Conversely, judicial precedent also supports restraint on
such powers, declaring improper a law that precipitates a “mere usurpation” of power by the
federal government.105 Roberts concedes that the ACA may be “necessary” to achieve its
intended goal of insurance reform, but it contravenes specifically enumerated federal powers and
constitutes an improper means for achieving that goal.

106

Roberts concludes that the mandate

grants the federal government a “great substantive and independent power”, which allows it to

101

See Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2585.
See id. at 2590 (making interesting distinction between the regulation of classes of individuals and the regulation
of classes of activities. The Government argued that because uninsured individuals actively seek out and obtain
health insurance they are “active in the market” and are therefore subject to regulation. Roberts contends that this
reasoning is backwards as the mandate targets younger, healthy individuals who are less likely in need of health
insurance. The mandate targets a class of individuals , who not yet engaged in commerce, rather than the activity
these individuals engage in).
103 See id. 2590-91 (“Congress will regulate the American people from cradle to grave!”).
104 See United States v. Comstock , 560 U.S. 126, 148-49 (2010).
105 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997).
106 See Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2592.
102
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reach beyond its enumerated constitutional boundaries and draw within its regulatory scope those
individuals who would otherwise fall outside of it.107
At this point in Roberts’ opinion, it seemed as though he had made up his mind, that the
ACA had valid goals yet far exceeded permissible federal power. “The most straightforward
reading of the mandate,” Roberts asserts, “is that it commands individuals to purchase
insurance.”108

However, Roberts articulates a second, equally plausible interpretation: that the

individual mandate does not compel individuals to buy insurance, but rather imposes a tax on
those who fail to do so.109 The mandate establishes a condition, i.e., not owning health
insurance, which triggers a tax, i.e., the shared responsibility payment.110 Roberts invokes the
historically recognized judicial duty to save a law from unconstitutionality if one can find any
fair means to do so. 111
To invoke the taxing power, Roberts must determine if the shared responsibility payment
constitutes a penalty or a tax. Roberts provides three justifications for interpreting it as a tax,
including: (1) the tax is far less than the price of insurance; (2) the mandate does not contain a
scienter requirement; and (3) the payment is collected by the IRS through normal means of
taxation.112 The mere fact that the mandate encourages individuals to engage in certain conduct
does not render the tax a penalty, as a penalty entails some unlawful act or omission with ensuing
negative legal consequences.113 Beyond requiring a payment to the IRS the mandate, the
mandate did not impose negative legal consequences.114

107

See id.
See id. at 2593.
109 See id. at 2593-94.
110 Id. at 2564.
111 See Tribe, supra. at 63.
112 Id. at 2595-96.
113 See id.
114 Id. at 2597.
108
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Roberts’ theme surfaces once again. Roberts’ emphasizes that Congress’ taxing power
has its limits.115 Even if the mandate operated as a tax, it would lose its character as a tax if it
became the functional equivalent of a penalty, i.e., a mechanism for regulation and
punishment.116 Congress’ authority to tax is strictly limited to its power to direct payment and
collect money.117 Since Congress obtained the power to tax a particular transaction, the
legislature bears the burden to oversee and ensure its reasonableness.118
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito do not agree with Roberts’ interpretation of
the individual mandate. The justices accuse Roberts of overstepping his judicial role to interpret
law and rewriting the mandate in order to save it from unconstitutionality.119
Justice Ginsberg denounced the Chief Justice’s reasoning that the mandate could be
saved by the taxing power even though the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause
afforded the federal government sufficient authority to invoke and carry out the individual
mandate.120 Ginsberg asserts that the mandate was regulatory in nature and that it could be
upheld in that manner.121 In sharp contrast to Justice Roberts, Ginsberg asserts that the Framers
of the Constitution intended that the Commerce Clause grant Congress the authority to enact
economic legislation in the interests of the Union and in those cases where the separate states are
incompetent to do so.122 To capably carry out such an enormous power, Congress must maintain

115

Id. at 2599.
Id. at 2600.
117 See id. (concluding that Commerce Clause grants Congress greater control over individual behavior than that
granted by the taxing power, and under the Commerce Clause, Congress may command individuals to do as it
directs and those who disobey may be subjected to criminal sanctions, which suggests that this power contains
regulatory and punitive elements).
118 See id.; see also Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 51 (2012)
(discussing cases).
119 See id. at 2651, 2655 (Scalia, Kennedy, Alito, Thomas J. dissenting).
120 See id. at 2613, 2618-19 (Ginsberg, J. dissenting) (Justice Sotomayor joined).
121 See id. at 2619.
122 See id. at 2615-16 (“Alexander Hamilton emphasized, ‘than to infer the extent of any power, proper to be lodged
in the national government, from ... its immediate necessities. There ought to be a CAPACITY to provide for future
116
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leeway to undertake and solve national problems directly and realistically. 123 Justice Ginsberg
pillories Roberts for the “inactivity” limitation.124 Ginsberg exclaims, “[g]iven these farreaching effects on interstate commerce, the decision to forgo insurance is hardly
inconsequential or equivalent to ‘doing nothing.”

125

She prophesies that the sheer number of

uninsured individuals who do not need insurance coverage today will likely need it tomorrow.126
Therefore, the decision to forego insurance has substantial effects on the national economy and
constitutes an economic decision the federal government has the authority to regulate.127
ii.

Boumediene v. Bush (2008) (Dissent)

In 2008, the Roberts Court revisited the extent of power of the federal government and
the delicate balance between the Executive and Legislatives branches in a different context.
In 2001, the Bush Administration United States launched its War on Terror. 128 In the
wake of the War on Terror, the Administration enacted several laws that limited the rights of
enemy personnel captured at home and abroad.129 In 2001, the Bush Administration enacted the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”), which authorized the President to “use all
necessary and appropriate forces” against any nation, organization, or person that “planned,
authorized, committed, or aided” the attacks of 2001 to prevent future attacks against the United
States.130 The AUMF authorized the detention of detainees or enemy personnel at the United
States’ Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, over which the United States maintained an indefinite

contingencies[,] as they may happen; and as these are illimitable in their nature, it is impossible safely to limit that
capacity.’”).
123 See id. at 2616.
124 See id. at 2615.
125 See id. at 2617.
126 See id. at 2620.
127 See id. at 2619-20, 2621.
128 See Tribe, supra. at 186.
129 See id.
130 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40 (2001).
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lease and de jure sovereignty.131 In 2002, the Executive Branch enacted the Military
Commission No. 1, which provided in part that all cases concerning enemy personnel be heard
by a military commission, that these commissions could consider hearsay evidence and any
evidence obtained through enhanced interrogation techniques, and that detainees could not hear
or learn about any evidence deemed classified prior to trial. 132 Additionally, it limited a
detainees’ ability to seek habeas corpus review.133 From 2004 onward, the Court tackled and
declared unconstitutional many of the Bush Administration’s national security policies.134
In 2005, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (“DTA”), which
prohibited any court, justice, or judge from considering an application for habeas corpus filed by
or on behalf of an alien detained at Guantanamo and gave the D.C. Court of Appeals “exclusive”
jurisdiction to review CSRT decisions. 135 In 2006, Congress passed the Military Commissions
Act of 2006 (“MCA”), which contained provisions similar to those enumerated in the Military
Commission No. 1.136
The Court considered the constitutionality of the DTA and MCA in Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008).137 Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, holding that aliens

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (upholding federal government’s power to detain aliens at
Guantanamo Bay as a fundamental and necessary incident to war).
132 See Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1 § 6(A)(3), 4(C).
133 See id.
134 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that Guantanamo Bay was not outside civilian court jurisdiction
and that detainees must be afforded habeas corpus relief); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)
(declaring Military Commission No. 1 unconstitutional because Constitution authorized Congress, not Executive
Branch, to set up military commissions and to try enemy personnel detained in War on Terror).
135 See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, § 1005(e), 10 U.S.C.A. § 801 (2006).
136 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (2014); see also H.R. Rep. No. 109-664(II), 2006
WL 2767036, Purpose and Summary (Sept. 25, 2006) (Commissions may hear and consider hearsay evidence or any
evidence obtained through enhanced interrogation techniques and det ainees could not attempt to refute or learn
about evidence against them deemed classified. Moreover, the Act attempted to mandate that all outstanding habeas
corpus submissions on behalf of the captives should be quashed); See Alissa J. Kness, The Military Commissions
Act of 2006: An Unconstitutional Response to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld , 52 S.D. L. Rev. 382, 383 (2007).
137 See Linda Greenhouse, The Mystery of Guantánamo Bay Jefferson Lecture University of California, Berkeley
September 17, 2008, 27 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 1, 17-18 (2009) (noting that the Court initially refused to hear
Boumediene v. Bush, with Justice Souter, Justice Ginsberg, and Justice Breyer dissenting, however, last minute
statements by army personnel on behalf of Boumediene swayed the Court to h ear the case).
131
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detained as enemy combatants have the right to habeas corpus under the Constitution and any
alternative procedures provided by Congress in the DTA and MCA were insufficient.138 Much
of Kennedy’s argument is predicated on the notion that habeas corpus relief is a fundamental
individual liberty and a right historically afforded to aliens.139 For the first half of Kennedy’s
opinion he analyzes the birth and evolution of habeas corpus in painstaking detail, slowly
moving from its origination in England’s Magna Carta to its use during World War II.140
Kennedy draws numerous analogies between England and its foreign territories under de facto
English control, such as Ireland, wherein habeas corpus was afforded to non-citizens.141
Kennedy states that the Constitution and its drafters believed that freedom from unlawful
restraint constituted a fundamental principle of liberty and the writ of habeas corpus constituted
the means to secure that freedom.142 Kennedy asserts that the Suspension Clause protects an
individual’s habeas corpus rights by providing that habeas corpus may be suspended only in
cases of a threat to public safety, such as in cases of rebellion or invasion.143 Following
precedent set forth in Johnson v. Eisentrager, Kennedy concludes the Suspension Clause applies
in the present case because the petitioners are aliens arrested outside the United States, the
United States maintains complete control and jurisdiction over the detention, and the financial
and administrative costs of holding the Suspension Clause applicable in a case of military
detention abroad as not so great as to limit the reach of the Clause.

144

Therefore, Kennedy

determines that there was no justification to suspend the writ. 145

138

See Tribe, supra. at 197.
See id.
140 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 740-41 (2008) (Kennedy, J.).
141 See id. at 750-51.
142 See Tribe, supra. at 197-98.
143 See Boumediene, 553 at 745-46, 756.
144 See id. at 766-67 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777 (1950)) (Kennedy articulates a three-part test
to ascertain the reach of the Suspension Clause in United States territories, including: (a) is the detainee an enemy
alien; (b) has the detainee never been or resided in the United States; (c) was the detainee captured outside of United
139
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Next, Kennedy distinguishes the habeas corpus restrictions of the MCA and DTA from
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which the Court
declared constitutional.146 In contrast to the prisoners targeted by the AEDPA, the detainees did
not receive a fair trial in open court nor did they have the opportunity to directly appeal their
convictions.147 Furthermore, Kennedy compares the MCA and DTA to judicially recognized
“habeas substitutes”.148 These “habeas substitutes”, Kennedy determines, provided alternative
or substitute review procedures that streamlined the review process rather than eliminating it all
together.149 In Kennedy’s view, the MCA and DTA totally suspend the habeas corpus right and
circumscribe the proper channels for habeas review in federal court.150
Lastly, Kennedy rejects the government’s argument that the United States lacked
sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay and therefore the petitioners could not assert their habeas
corpus rights.151 Kennedy finds that the United States clearly exercised de facto control over
Guantanamo Bay for more than a hundred years and as such, constitutional protections of habeas
corpus relief ran from the United States to its Naval Base. 152 Additionally, because the writ of
habeas corpus extended to the Naval Base, the detainees were not required to exhaust their
procedures of judicial review prior to invoking the right. 153

States territory and held in military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was the detainee tried and convicted by a
Military Commission sitting outside the United States; (e) was the detainee tried for offenses against laws of war
committed outside the United States; (f) and is the detainee at all times imprisoned outside the United States).
145 See id.
146 See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1997) (upholding AEDPA’s provisions limiting ability of persons to file
successive writs of habeas corpus because it did not unconstitutionally suspend the writ in violation of the
Suspension Clause).
147 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 777-78.
148 See id. at 785 (citing Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952)).
149 See id.
150 See id. at 777-78.
151 See id. at 753.
152 See id. at 753, 756.
153 See id. at 794-95.
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From the outset of his dissent, Roberts criticizes the majority for intervening in affairs
left solely for the federal government without any legally cognizable power to intervene.154
Roberts asserts that Congress set up a system that provided some of the most “extensive legal
and procedural protections” afforded enemy combatants in the history of the United States. 155
Roberts surmises that “[o]ne cannot help but think after surveying the modest practical results of
the majority’s ambitious opinion that this decision is not really about the detainees at all, but
about control of federal policy regarding enemy combatants.”156
Accordingly, Roberts addresses a threshold matter apart from the writ’s scope. 157
Roberts asserts that “[t]he critical threshold question in these cases”, prior to any inquiry about
the writ’s scope, “is whether the system the political branches designed protects whatever rights
the detainees may possess”.158 If the system protects detainee rights, then there is no need for
any additional process, such as habeas relief.159 Roberts calls the majority reasoning
“misguided” and “fruitless” because it does not analyze the process of the DTA or its satisfaction
of detainee rights, but simply shifts the responsibility of overseeing foreign policy and national
security concerns from the federal government to the judiciary.

160

Roberts details the judicial review process that Congress envisioned when it enacted the
DTA. The detainee appears before a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (“CSRT”) followed by
review in the D.C. Circuit. Congress authorized the D.C. Circuit to decide whether the CSRT
proceedings were consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.161 Roberts

See id. at 801 (Roberts, J. dissenting) (Roberts joins Justice Scalia’s opinion analyzing judicial precedent and
history of habeas corpus).
155 See id.
156 See id.
157 See id. at 802.
158 See id.
159 See id.
160 See id.
161 See id. at 803.
154
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contends that because the Supreme Court granted certiorari before the D.C. Circuit could render
its review, the Court cannot determine if Circuit review vindicates the petitioner’s rights and if
the petitioner-detainees are entitled to habeas relief.162

The effect of the majority’s decision,

Roberts forewarns, is to impose an additional, time-consuming judicial review process that may
not prove to be any more effective than the statutorily defined process under the DTA. 163
Roberts found support for his argument in the Court’s previous decision in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld.164 The Court in Hamdi, Roberts argues, concluded that a military tribunal could
adequately and properly vindicate a citizen enemy combatant’s due process rights, and if
necessary, a citizen enemy combatant could seek review in an Article III court.165 Roberts’
suggests that if Hamdi found that a military tribunal satisfied the due process rights of a citizen,
then non-citizens should receive no greater rights.166 The DTA represented Congress’ attempt to
provide accused alien combatants constitutionally adequate opportunities to contest their
detentions before a military tribunal, i.e., CSRT, and seek review in an Article III court, i.e., D.C.
Circuit.167 In accordance with judicial precedent, Roberts concludes that DTA’s two-tier level of
review, with the combined efforts of the CSRT and D.C. Circuit, sufficiently protects the alien
enemy combatant’s due process rights.168
Roberts then analyzes every statutory right afforded to petitioners at the CSRT stage.
Roberts cites to the Government’s Implementation Memorandum and determines that every
petitioner possesses the right to present evidence that he was wrongfully detained, including to

162

See id. at 803, 804.
See id. at 807-808.
164 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 504 (2004) (guaranteeing an American citizen challenging his detention as an
enemy combatant the right to notice of the evidence before him and a fair opportunity to rebut the evidence before a
neutral decisionmaker).
165 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533, 538.
166 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 804 (emphasis added).
167 See id. at 810.
168 See id.
163
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call all reasonably available witnesses, to question hostile witnesses, to introduce documentary
evidence, and to testify before the tribunal. 169 Roberts’ rejects the majority’s disapproval of the
admission of hearsay stating that Hamdi expressly approved the use of hearsay by habeas
courts.170 Additionally, Roberts notes that each petitioner is provided a personal representative,
who reviews classified documents and challenges this evidence at the CSRT on the petitioner’s
behalf.171 “Keep in mind”, Roberts reassures, “that all this is just at the CSRT stage”.172
Roberts flatly rejects the majority’s argument that because the DTA prohibits a petitioner
from presenting new or additional evidence after the CSRT stage, but before the D.C. Circuit
stage, the DTA does not constitute a sufficient replacement for habeas review.173 Roberts
criticizes the majority for declaring unconstitutional an act of Congress based upon some
hypothetical case wherein a detainee loses out on the benefits of newly discovered evidence. 174
Roberts fully acknowledges that the DTA does not envision the introduction of newly discovered
evidence before the D.C. Circuit, but the DTA permits the D.C. Circuit to remand a case for a
new CSRT determination.175 Roberts assumes that if newly discovered evidence appeared, the
D.C. Circuit would remand for additional findings.176

More importantly, Roberts affirms that

judicial precedent dictates that the Court’s decision to declare an act unconstitutional cannot be
solely predicated on hypothetical cases.177

169

See id. at 816-17.
See id.
171 See id. 816-17 (noting that Geneva Convention, like the DTA, does not allow prisoners of war or detainees to
gain or ever gain access to classified files).
172 See id. at 818 (discussing additional safeguards in D.C. Circuit).
173 See id. at 818-19.
174 See id. at 820.
175 See id.
176 See id.
177 See id.
170
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In conclusion, Roberts suggests that Congress fell victim to a “bait and switch”.178
Roberts contends that Hamdi’s rationale was directly applicable to this case, but the majority
afforded it scant review.179 Congress, the President, and the Nation’s military leaders made a
good faith effort to comply with the Court’s precedent, but the majority refused to take “yes” as
answer.180 Roberts criticizes the majority for misconstruing the structure of the DTA when its
structure looks very similar to the structure blessed by the Hamdi Court.181 Similarly, Roberts
derides the majority for declaring unconstitutional the DTA without recommending or proposing
alternatives of its own and disregarding evidence that the DTA will look substantially similar to
habeas relief.182 Lastly, Roberts criticizes the majority for displacing Congress’ policy choices
with the majority’s own.183 The role of the judiciary, Roberts contends, was to determine if the
DTA and MCA procedures meet the essential standard of fairness under the Due Process Clause;
it was not to displace congressional choices of policy with the judiciary’s own. 184
b. First Amendment – Freedom Of Speech
i.

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)

In 2010, the Supreme Court tackled the First Amendment rights of corporations to
advocate or oppose the election or defeat of political candidates. The Court afforded
corporations and unions the right to spend as much money as they choose so long as these

178

See id. at 811.
See id.
180 See id. at 812, 822 (criticizing majority because it refuses to concede that Congress did something right; that in
spite of earlier failed attempts, Congress intended to enact an adequate substitute for habeas relief).
181 See id. at 812, 823 (criticizing the majority’s persistent misreading of the statute and arguing that the statute, like
general habeas review law, clearly grants the CSRT, D.C. Circuit, and Administrative Review boards the authority
to order the release of a detainee and therefore fashion a remedy and that this statutorily defined remedy constitutes
a sufficient substitute for habeas relief).
182 See id.
183 See id. at 822.
184 See id. at 825.
179
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entities do not coordinate their political advertising with a candidate’s campaign. 185 Many
commenters criticize Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission for irreparably harming
the nation’s political process by allowing corporate funds to covertly coordinate “independent”
election activities.186 However, the Roberts Court was in a tough position as its current judicial
precedent on a corporation’s First Amendment rights was contradictory and did not articulate a
clear rule as to what campaign activities a corporation could lawfully influence.
The case arose from efforts by Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation that accepted
contributions from for-profit corporations, to promote and distribute a documentary aptly named
Hillary: The Movie that attacked Hillary Clinton during her efforts to obtain the Democratic
president nomination. Citizens United sought to distribute and promote Hillary: The Movie
through video-on-demand and television. Federal law prohibited any “electioneering
communications” funded by corporations from taking place thirty days before a primary
election.187 Citizens United challenged limitations imposed by Section 203 of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”) on independent expenditures made by corporations
within thirty days of a primary election. 188 During the first round of oral arguments, Citizens
United argued that Hillary: The Movie did not constitute an electioneering communication that
urged voters to defeat Clinton’s nomination. 189 Rather, it took a broader critical view of Hillary
Clinton’s political ideologies and actions. 190 However, several of the more conservative justices,
including Alito, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas sought to decide the broader constitutional issue

See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
See Tribe, supra. at 89.
187 See 2 U.S.C. §441(b).
188 See Tribe, supra. at 91.
189 See id. at 92.
190 See id.
185
186
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from the very beginning.191 Ultimately, Citizens United sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) and argued that current limitations imposed by
Section 203 on corporate independent expenditures resulted in an unreasonable chilling effect on
First Amendment free speech rights. 192
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court. 193 Justice Kennedy’s opinion praised the
values of unfettered free speech and criticized government censorship, even if wellintentioned.194 Extolling the core principles of First Amendment liberty, Justice Kennedy did not
fully decide Citizens United on narrow grounds.195 Kennedy moved beyond a narrow holding
that the movie was not publically distributed nor the functional equivalent of express advocacy
into the limitations of the First Amendment.196 In order to address the constitutional limitations
of the First Amendment, Kennedy reconsidered the entire facial validity of Section 203 and its
effects on political speech.197 Kennedy reasoned that because these types of cases invoke serious
implications for statutory and constitutional interpretation the Court should address and correct
any inconsistencies in his past jurisprudence.198
Kennedy asserted that the Court has consistently recognized that First Amendment
protections extend to associations of persons, individuals, and corporations and any limitations

191

See id.; see also Jeffrey Toobin, The Oath, 165-69 (New York: Random House, 2012) (noting that the Court the
parties back to reargue the constitutional issues after it decided that Hillary: The Movie did not constitute an
electioneering communication).
192 See id.
193 Justice Thomas joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion except for Part VI.
194 See Tribe, supra. at 93
195 See id.
196 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 892 (holding that Court could not resolve Citizens United on an as applied basis,
solely analyzing the facts of the case before it, as this would chill political speech. Therefore, the Court broade ned
the case from Citizen’s United initial narrower arguments, focusing only on Hillary, to reconsider both the validity
of its prior jurisprudence and the facial validity of § 441b).
197 See id. at 892-94 (applying strict scrutiny and requiring government to demonstrate that statute served a
compelling interest and was narrowly tailored to meet that interest).
198 See id. at 894-95.

25

Katerina Mantell
Professor Wefing – U.S. Supreme Court
cannot be premised on the entity’s corporate identity.199 Kennedy rectified the holding in Austin
v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce with more corporation-friendly jurisprudence.200 In
addressing limitations of the First Amendment on corporations, Kennedy determined the preAustin line of reasoning that forbids restrictions on political speech based on the speaker’s
corporate identity is the correct reasoning.201 The majority held that prohibitions on corporate
speech imposed by Section 441(b) constitutes an outright ban on free speech and since the
government could not articulate a narrowly tailored and compelling interest that supports such
ban, Section 441(b)’s ban is unconstitutional. 202 Kennedy rejects the government’s argument
that it sought to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption.203 Additionally, Kennedy
rejects the government’s argument that it sought to protect corporate shareholder rights. 204
Justice Roberts wrote a concurring opinion that addressed the importance of adhering to
stare decisis and the importance of abandoning precedent that is no longer viable.205 Roberts
asserts that the First Amendment protects “more than just the individual on a soapbox and the

199

See First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n. 714 (1978) (declaring unconstitutional
Massachusetts campaign finance law that prohibited corporate donations in ballot initiatives unless the corporation’s
interests were directly involved and allowing corporations to exercise their First Amendment rights through
contributions); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 56, 96 S. Ct. 612, 652, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976) (invalidating
federal expenditure ban, which applied to individuals, corporations, and unions, because it failed to serve any
substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corrup tion in the electoral process , but
upholding public financing scheme, disclosure rules, and limits on direct contributions to campaigns ).
200 Id. at 888-89, 912-13 (overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 492 U.S. 652 (1990), which upheld a
requirement that corporations use a political action committee rather than the corporation’s general treasury funds to
support or oppose candidates for office in the state of Michigan ).
201 Id. at 903-904.
202 Id. at 897, 913.
203 See id. at 909-10 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93,
136-138 (2003) (rejecting “anti-corruption” argument and holding that: (1) independent expenditures “do not give
rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption”; (2) government interest of preventing corruption was limited to
quid pro quo corruption; (3) this interest justifies restrictions on direct contributions to candidates, not on
independent expenditures; and (4) any influence of independent expenditures in the electoral or campa ign process
will not result in loss of confidence in political process).
204 See id. at 911 (rejecting “shareholder protection” argument and holding that: Under a shareholder protection
interest, if shareholders of a media corporation disagreed with its political views, the government would have the
authority to restrict the media corporation’s political speech, i.e., running editorials, and such a ban is over-inclusive
because it includes corporations comprised of a single shareholder).
205 See id. at 917 (Roberts, J.) (Justice Alito joined).
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lonely pamphleteer”.206 Roberts acknowledges that it is the Court’s obligation to refrain from
addressing constitutional questions except when necessary to decide issues before it. 207
Nevertheless, Roberts contends that the constitutional issue – whether Section 441(b) may be
enforced, consistent with the First Amendment, against corporations – was indispensably
necessary to resolving Citizens United.208
According to Roberts, “[t]here is a difference between judicial restraint and judicial
abdication”.209 Roberts disagrees with the dissent’s reaffirmation of Austin decision and
contends that the cases succeeding Austin did not specifically ask the Court to reconsider
Austin’s holding.210 Roberts criticizes the dissent for overlooking the negative consequences of
Austin on the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence and recognizes that while stare decisis is
important, it is a “principle of policy” subject to change in a principled and intelligible way. 211
Roberts agrees with the majority opinion that Austin constituted an “aberration” that departed
significantly from corporation-friendly First Amendment jurisprudence, which specifically
declared unconstitutional restrictions on speech that enhanced the voice of others or equalized
the ability of individuals or groups to influence the outcome of elections. 212 Roberts contends
that the slight factual distinctions between Citizens United and previous cases do not sanction
prohibitions on a corporation’s rights under the First Amendment. 213

206

See id.
See id. at 918.
208 See id. at 919.
209 See id.
210 See id. at 920.
211 See id.
212 See id. at 921 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49).
213 See id. (noting that Bellotti involved a referendum rather than a candidate election).
207
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Roberts interprets Austin’s rationale to authorize the prohibition of political speech by a
category of speakers solely to effectuate equality among speakers.214 Roberts criticizes the
dissent for succumbing to the “temptation” of equalizing speech and to prevent an individual or
group from more effectively supporting or opposing a candidate. 215 Roberts reiterates that to
rely on Austin when its reasoning spawns future mistakes would fundamentally undercut rule of
law principles that stare decisis seeks to protect and inhibits the Court’s jurisprudence from
developing in a principled and intelligible way. 216
ii.

Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806
(2011)

In 1998, Arizona reformed traditional public financing programs in response to several
corruption scandals involving its governor, several legislators, and two United States senators. 217
The Clean Citizens Elections Act provided public money to candidates who agreed to limit their
personal or private spending to $500, participate in at least one debate and return unspent
money.218 The matching funds provision of the Clean Citizens Elections Act provided that
candidates received initial public grants and then additional public funding based on amounts
spent by privately financed opponents and by independent groups supporting them. 219 The dual
purpose of the Act was to ensure that candidates relying predominantly on public funding were
not outspent by wealthy opponents and their supporters as well as to encourage candidates to

See id. at 922-23, 924 (rejecting government’s argument that Austin’s compelling interest was the prevention of
actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption and protection of corporate shareholders rights, rather than diminishment
of the corrosive and distorting effects of aggregations of wealth accumulated with assistance by corporations).
215 See id. at 923.
216 See id. at 924.
217 See Tribe, supra. at 116; see also Citizens Clean Elections Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-940 et seq. (1998).
218 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-941(A)(2), § 16-956(A)(2), § 16-953.
219 See §§ 16-952(A)-(C).
214
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utilize and recognize the benefits of Arizona’s public funding system. 220 Arizona followed in the
footsteps of several other states that implemented similar laws. 221
Past and future Arizona candidates and two independent expenditure groups, the
conservative Goldwater Institute and the libertarian Institute for Justice, challenged the
constitutionality of the matching funds provision, arguing that it penalized their speech and
burdened their ability to exercise their rights under the First Amendment. 222 The District Court
entered a permanent injunction against Arizona’s enforcement of the matching funds
provision.223 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the provision imposed minimal burden on
First Amendment rights and that it was justified by the State’s interest to reduce quid pro quo
political corruption.224
Roberts wrote the majority opinion.225 Roberts predominantly relies precedent set forth
in Davis v. Federal Election Commission.226 Davis stands for the proposition that a state or the
federal government cannot enact campaign finance laws so restrictive that it unconstitutionally
coerces a candidate or its supporters to choose between the right to engage in “unfettered free
speech” or succumb to discriminatory fundraising limitations implemented solely to level the
playing field.227 Roberts states that Davis’s logic controls in the instant case as the matching
funds provision “imposes an unprecedented penalty” on a wealthy candidate’s ability to exercise
220

See Tribe, supra. at 116.
See Adam Liptak, Justices Strike Down Arizona Campaign Finance Law, NYTimes.com,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/28/us/politics/28campaign.ht ml?_r= 0, Jun. 27, 2011 (noting that Connecticut,
Florida, Maine, Minnesota and North Carolina adopted public financing systems similar to Arizona’s, but courts
blocked the enforcement of these laws ).
222 See Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2816 (2011).
223 See id. (Roberts, J.)
224 See id.
225 Justices Alito, Thomas, Kennedy, and Scalia joined.
226 See Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 742 (2008) (declaring unconstitutional the “Millionaire’s
Amendment” of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(a), which provided that if a
candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives spent more than $35,000 of personal funds, the opponent of this
candidate could collect individual contributions up to $9,600 per co ntributor, or three times the normal contribution
limit of $2,300).
227 See Bennett, 131 S.Ct. at 2818.
221
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his or her free speech rights and permits his or her adversary to take advantage of the leveled
playing field.228 Moreover, Roberts asserts that Bennett poses even greater constitutional
implications than Davis as the matching funds provision initiates the direct and automatic release
of public money for the benefit of the public candidate at the expense of the privately funded
candidate, who may forego his or her personal spending as well as any spending provided by an
independent expenditure groups to avoid the matching funds automatic disbursal of funds.229
Roberts finds that independent expenditure groups suffer substantially from the matching
funds provision because these groups lack a political connection to the electoral process and rely
solely on the infiltration of monies to support or oppose a candidate.230 Roberts determines these
independent expenditure groups face a harsh choice, i.e., trigger the matching funds provision,
change the content of their speech, or withdraw entirely.231 Roberts states that the record
contains numerous examples of candidates curtailing fundraising efforts and discouraging
independent expenditure group donations.232 Roberts asserts that it is illogical to coerce a
candidate to hover just below the matching funds threshold by rejecting independent expenditure
funding or be subject to the discriminatory application of this threshold.233
Roberts then focuses his analysis on statutory structure and legislative intent to determine
if the matching funds provision furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve
that interest.234 Roberts does not find Arizona’s justifications to be compelling.235 Roberts

Id. (acknowledging that there is slight differences between the Millionaire’s Amendment analyzing in Davis and
the matching funds provision because the matching funds provision did not impose an outright cap).
229 Id. at 2819.
230 Id. at 2819-20.
231 Id. at 2820 (rejecting Arizona’s separate argument that Davis was distinguishable).
232 Id. at 2822.
233 See id. at 2823.
234 In accordance with this standard, the Court has consistently invalidated restrictions on campaign expenditures,
restraints on independent expenditures applied to express advocacy groups, limits on uncoordinated political party
expenditures, and prohibitions against unions, nonprofit associations, and corporations from making independent
expenditures for electioneering communication. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52-54 (1976); Federal
228
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rejects Arizona’s argument that the state has an interest in promoting free and open debate in
state elections because Arizona increases speech for one group while impermissibly burdening
the speech of another.236 To further this point, Roberts discredits the dissent’s claim that judicial
precedent has never found pubic funding or government subsidies for one group to constitute a
First Amendment burden on another group. 237 Roberts asserts that none of the cases the dissent
cites “involved a subsidy given in direct response to the political speech of another, to allow the
recipient to counter that speech.”238 In fact, the “direct response” is distinguishable from
disclosure or disclaimer requirements as these types of provisions do not result in a direct
windfall to the opposing party.239 Roberts concludes that it is the incremental distribution of
public funds in direct response to private funding that impermissibly burdens speech.240 The
state’s desire to the level the playing field is not compelling enough to warrant such an intrusion
on First Amendment rights, especially when Arizona enacted austere contribution limits and
stringent fundraising disclosure requirements to deter potential corruption. 241
Justice Kagan penned a forceful dissent, exclaiming that “[e]xcept in a world gone topsyturvy, additional campaign speech and electoral competitio n is not a First Amendment injury.”242
Kagan asserts that the petitioners’ claims are illogical because Arizona offered support to any

Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 256-65 (1986); Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 608 (1996); Citizens United v. Federal
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010).
235 See id. at 2820.
236 See id. at 2821.
237 See id.
238 See id. at 2822 n. 9 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91-95, 96).
239 See id. at 2822.
240 See id. at 2824, 2833 (Roberts acknowledged that if Arizona provided a lump -sum distribution without any
reference to concurrent private funding, such lump-sum provisions would not impermissibly burden speech. Unlike
the dissent, Roberts does not believe that the direct response model are substantially similar to the lump -sum model
and does not believe that the direct response model provides an improved method of distributing public funds).
241 See id. at 2825-26, 2827.
242 See id. at 2833 (Kagan, J. dissenting).
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person running for state office, but the petitioners refused that assistance.243 It is illogical to
claim that Arizona violated the petitioner’s First Amendment rights by disbursing funds to other
speakers when the petitioners could have received, but spurned, the state’s financial
assistance.244 Kagan asserts that “[s]ome people might call that chutzpah”.245 Kagan concludes
that Arizona’s matching funds provision subsidizes rather than restricts free speech to guarantee
robust campaigns that elect representatives not beholden to the few, but accountable to
everyone.246
c. Fourth Amendment – Warrantless Search and Seizure
i.

Georgia v. Randolph (2006) (Dissent)

In 2006, the Roberts Court tackled the issue of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition
against warrantless searches. Georgia v. Randolph was Roberts’ first dissent since ascending to
his role as Chief Justice.

247

On July 6, 2001, Respondent Scott Randolph and his wife, Janet, got

into a domestic dispute, which prompted Janet to call the police. 248 When the police came to the
Randolph residence, Janet informed the police that her husband removed their child to their
neighbor’s home.249 She also informed the police that her husband was a habitual cocaineuser.250 The police went with Janet to retrieve the boy and upon returning to the Randolph
residence she reiterated to the police claims of Scott’s drug abuse and volunteered that there was
drug evidence in the home.251 Janet consented to a police search.252 Scott refused to consent to a

243

See id. at 2835.
See id.
245 See id.
246 See id. at 2829, 2833.
247 See Linda Greenhouse, Roberts Dissent Reveals Strain Beneath Court’s Placid Surface, NY Times (Mar. 23,
2006) http://www.nytimes.com/2006/ 03/23/politics/23scotus .html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (the Court issued its
opinion in Georgia v. Randolph approximately five months after Roberts ascended to the role of Chief Justice).
248 See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 107 (2006).
249 See id.
250 See id.
251 See id.
244
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police search.253 Upon Janet’s consent, the police entered the house and found evidence of
drugs.254 At some point during the search Janet revoked her consent.255 Respondent was
indicted for possession of cocaine and the trial court denied his motion to suppress the evidence
as products of a warrantless search unauthorized by consent. 256
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue to be decided was as follows:
whether an evidentiary seizure is lawful with the permission of one occupant when the other,
who later seeks to suppress the evidence, is present at the scene and expressly refuses to
consent.257 The Court’s existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence held that a warrantless entry
and search of one’s premises is valid when police obtains voluntary consent of an occupant who
shares, or is reasonably believed to share, authority over the area in common with a co-occupant
criminal defendant.258 In this case, the Court held, that because Scott was physically present on
the premises and refused to consent to police entry, the police’s entry and search of the Randolph
residence constituted an unreasonable and invalid warrantless search.259
Souter determined that the facts in United States v. Matlock were reasonably analogous to
Randolph and as such, Matlock’s rule of law that co-habitation entails some form of common
understanding that one co-occupant can affect the other co-occupant’s interests is applicable.260
Nevertheless, Souter noted that this case was a matter of first impression for the Court as none of

252

See id.
See id.
254 See id.
255 See id.
256 See id. at 107-108.
257 See id. at 106.
258 See id. at 106, 109 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164
(1974)).
259 See id. at 106.
260 See id. at 109-110 (suggesting that if the police approach a dwelling and a woman with a baby on her hip permits
police entry and search, the validity of the search is premised on the reasonable belief that the woman resided as a
co-tenant in the dwelling and possessed the authority as a co-tenant to consent).
253
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the Court’s “co-occupant consent-to-search” cases contained the additional fact of a second
occupant being physically present and refusing permission to search.261
Justice Souter supports his decision to distinguish Randolph from preceding cases with
what he considers to be a “shared social expectation”. 262 Specifically, in the context of social
guests who temporarily inhabit a dwelling, Court precedent holds that these guests are entitled to
some degree of privacy and a co-occupant cannot consent to entry and search over the objection
of the guest.263 Souter argues that no reasonable person would enter and search a dwelling if a
co-occupant stood in the doorway saying, “stay out”.264 While Souter acknowledges the
consenting occupant’s interest in revealing criminal activity as well as his or her interest in
deflecting or dispelling any suspicion raised by sharing the dwelling with a criminal, a cooccupant must obtain these benefits without the advantage of a rule of law that ignores his or her
co-occupant’s refusal.265 Souter asserted that the threshold element of “physical presence”
offered a justified and pragmatic formula, a bright-line in which to judge warrantless searches.266
The Chief Justice criticizes the majority opinion for creating a new precedent in the
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence based upon “randomness” and “happenstance”,
overlooking the grim realities that will likely result from such a peculiar, yet judicially invoked
protection.267 Roberts first explains the current judicial precedent clearly stands for the

261

Compare Randolph, 547 U.S. at 109, with Matlock , 415 U.S. at 166 (Respondent Matlock was arrested for
robbery and sought to suppress evidence obtained during the search of his premises, which he rented from the Graff
family. The Graff family rented the home to several other individuals, including Matlock and Ms. Graff. When the
police approached the dwelling, Ms. Graff allegedly consented to their entrance. Matlock followed judicial
precedent, which held that the consent of one who possesses co mmon authority over premises or effects is valid as
against the absent, non-consenting person with whom that authority is shared) (emphasis added).
262 See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111.
263 See id. at 113 (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 99 (1990)).
264 See id. at 113.
265 See id. at 115-16.
266 See id. at 122.
267 See id. at 127 (Roberts, J. dissenting).
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proposition that a warrantless search is reasonable if police obtain the voluntary consent of a
person authorized to give it, including co-occupants.268
Roberts cautions that the practical effects of the majority’s limitation pins the consenter
against the objector.269 The majority’s limitation necessarily places the consenter, the objector,
and the police in the predicament of determining who holds more authority to consent to or
refuse entry and search.270 To demonstrate the peculiarity of the majority’s opinion, Roberts
postulates a number of hypothetical situations in which a guest may feel disinclined to turn away
from a room or dwelling even if a co-occupant objects.271 Roberts explains that an invited guest,
i.e., the police, who encounters two disagreeing co-occupants would not turn away based upon
what the majority considers a social expectation. 272 Roberts stresses that long settled judicial
precedent recognizes that while “[o]ur common social expectations” assume that one will not
share with another what we have shared with them, “…that is the risk we take in sharing.”273
One of Roberts’ hypotheticals depicts a domestic violence case. Robert forewarns that
there will be many cases in which a consenting co-occupant’s wish to have the police enter is
overridden by an objection from another present co-occupant.274 As a result of the co-occupant’s
refusal, the police will turn away and the consenting co-occupant will likely be subject to the
same or worse abuse for calling and acquiescing to a police search.

275

In accordance with his judicial philosophy, Roberts continuously reiterates long-settled
judicial precedent throughout his dissenting opinion. Roberts argues that the majority’s efforts to
268

See id.
See id. at 129.
270 See id.
271 See id.
272 See id. at 130.
273 See id. at 131, 133 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 446 U.S. 109, 117 (1984); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 443 (1976); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) for proposition that “shared social expectations” is not
a widely used as a means of demonstrating “reasonableness” in existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
274 See id. at 136-37.
275 See id. at 138.
269
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distinguish Matlock and Rodriguez based on factual inconsistencies are misplaced.276
Specifically, if the criminal defendants in Matlock and Rodriguez had been present to object, one
can reasonably assume that they would have done so.277 The co-occupants in Matlock and
Rodriguez possessed authority to admit the police into areas over which they exercised control,
despite the presumed wishes of their present co-occupants.278 “The common thread in our
decisions upholding searches conducted pursuant to third-party consent”, Roberts explains, “is
an understanding that a person ‘assume[s] the risk’ that those who have access to and control
over his shared property might consent to a search”.279
d. Eighth Amendment – Cruel and Unusual Punishment
i.

Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008)

In 2008, in Baze v. Rees, the court considered Kentucky’s capital punishment regime for
certain criminal offenses.280 Kentucky provided for legal injection as a humane method of
execution.281 The petitioners, convicted of double homicide, did not dispute that the lethal
injection protocol, if applied as intended, would result in a humane death.282 Rather, the
petitioners argued if improperly applied, the execution could result in significant pain,
constituting cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.283
Roberts delivered the opinion of the court. Roberts discusses, albeit briefly, the evolution
of capital punishment and preferred methods of execution, including hanging, electrocution, and

276

See id. at 133-34 (citing Matlock , 415 U.S. at 166; Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179).
See id. at
278 Id. at 134.
279 See id. at 134.
280 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 40 (2008) (Roberts, J.).
281 See id.; see also Execution of Death Sentence, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.220(1)(a).
282 See id..
283 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 41, 62.
277
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lethal injection.284 Roberts calculates that 36 states and the federal government have adopted
lethal injection as the exclusive or primary means of implementing the death penalty and 30 of
those states used Kentucky’s combination of drugs in their lethal injection protocols.285 Roberts
opines that while the Court “[h]as never invalidated a State’s chosen procedure for carrying out a
sentence of death as the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment”, states have voluntarily
restructured their methods to ensure humane execution of its prisoners. 286
Judicial precedent dictates that subjecting individuals to a risk of future harm, i.e., if the
lethal injection procedures are improperly applied, can qualify as cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.287 Roberts explains that in order to violate the Eighth
Amendment the procedures must be “sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless
suffering,” and give rise to “sufficiently imminent dangers”, as well as pose “substantial risk of
serious harm,” or an “objectively intolerable risk of harm”.288 Additionally, Roberts relies on
existing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that holds, “[s]imply because an execution method
may result in pain…does not establish the sort of ‘objectively intolerable risk of harm’ that
qualifies as cruel and unusual”.289 Roberts concludes that the slight risk of pain depicted by the

284

See Baze, supra. at 44 (noting that Kentucky, for example, used electrocution as the humane form of execution
until 1998. Kentucky provided that prisoners convicted before 1998 could opt for electrocution, but the prisoners
must do so 20 days before their scheduled executions. By 2008, the statute dictated that lethal injection was the
default method of execution).
285 See id. at 43-44 n. 1 (citing cases); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3591 et seq. (providing for lethal injection by federal
government).
286 See id. at 48 (citing to cases where the Court upheld execution by firing squad and electrocution as humane forms
of execution).
287 The petitioners argued that there was significant risk that the procedures for administering the sodium thiopental,
or the barbiturate general anesthetic, would not be followed and therefore the drug would not have its intended
effect. Id. at 49.
288 Id. (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 34–35 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 846
(1994)).
289 See id. at 50 (citing Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), where mechanical malfunction
in electrocution chair constituted an “accident” and cruel and unusual punishment).
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petitioners did not warrant a finding that Kentucky’s lethal injection procedures violated the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 290
Moreover, Roberts dismisses the petitioners’ claims that a slightly modified, safer
alternative exists and because of these proposed alternatives the current lethal injection protocol
violates the Eighth Amendment.291 The proffered alternative method must address the
“substantial risk of harm” and to do so it must be feasible, readily implemented, and significantly
reduce a substantial risk of severe pain. 292 Roberts has no intention of transforming the courts
into “boards of inquiry” responsible for determining “best practices” of executions. 293
Roberts meticulously analyzes the extensive protocol for administering the lethal
injection explicitly outlined in Kentucky’s execution on death sentence statute.294 Given
Kentucky’s extensive lethal injection protocol, including redundant measures for ensuring the
administration of sufficient dosage of lethal drugs and constant medical oversight to correct any
deficiencies, Roberts concluded that any risks identified by petitioners were not so substantial or
imminent as to amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. 295
Roberts recognizes that “[r]easonable people of good faith disagree on the morality and
efficacy of capital punishment”, however, “for many who oppose it no method of execution
would ever be acceptable”.296 Despite opposition to capital punishment, the Court has

290

See id.
See id. at 51, 57-58.
292 See id. at 52.
293 See id. at 51 (forewarning that transforming courts into “boards of inquiry” will result in increased litigation with
petitioners looking to protract execution process with new technology that purports to improve procedures ).
294 See id. at 45-46 (examining statutorily mandated safeguards, including: (1) administration of precise quantity of
drugs; (2) presence of certified medical personnel to perform the venipuncture procedures; (3) additional medical
personnel to mix the precise quantity of drugs; (4) the construction of execution facilities with a control room,
monitored by the warden and deputy warden separated from the witness room; and (5) the presence of a physician to
revive the prisoner if a stay of execution should be granted).
295 Id. at 55-56 (noting that Kentucky executed one prisoner pursuant to this protocol without any issues).
296 See id. at 61.
291
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consistently held that the Constitution does not prohibit capital punishment. 297 Furthermore,
Roberts reiterates the Court has never set a precedent for declaring any state method of execution
cruel or unusual.
ii.

298

Roberts has no intention of setting such a precedent.

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)

Jamer Graham was 16 years old when he committed armed burglary in Jacksonville,
Florida.299 Graham entered into a plea agreement with the prosecution.

300

The Florida trial

court sentenced Graham to probation and withheld adjudication of guilt. 301 Shortly thereafter,
Graham was arrested for a home invasion robbery, a crime of which he denied involvement.

302

As a result, the trial court adjudicated Graham guilty of the earlier charges, revoked his
probation, and sentenced him to life in prison for the burglary.

303

However, because Florida

abolished its parole system, the life sentence left Graham no possibility of parole.304 Graham
challenged his sentence under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause.305 The Florida First District Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction. 306
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, addressed the principal issue: whether the
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause permits a juvenile offender to be
sentenced to life in prison without parole for a non-homicide crime.307 Kennedy explains that the
Eighth Amendment specifically bars the imposition of excessive fines or bail or the use of cruel
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See id.
See id. at 62.
299 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 53 (2010), as modified (July 6, 2010).
300 See id. at 54.
301 See id.
302 See id.
303 See id.; see also Adam Liptak, Justices Limit Life Sentences for Juveniles, NYTimes.com
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/us/politics/18court.html?_r=0, May 17, 2010.
304 See id.; see also Fla. Stat. § 921.002(1)(e) (2003).
305 See id.
306 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 58.
307 See id. at 52-53 (Kennedy, J.).
298
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and unusual or barbaric punishments. 308 Judicial precedent dictates that a determination of
whether a punishment is cruel and unusual is predicated on evolving standards of decency of
society; this standard embodies a moral judgment.309 Furthermore, Kennedy states that the
“concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment” and existing jurisprudence.310
Kennedy acknowledges that the Court has not consistently applied the test for
proportionality.311 In Harmelin v. Michigan, the Court held that that the Eighth Amendment
contains “‘narrow proportionality principle,’ that ‘does not require strict proportionality between
crime and sentence’ but rather ‘forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’
to the crime’”.312 Pursuant to the Harmelin standard, the Court evaluates if a punishment is
“grossly disproportionate to the crime” by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity
of the sentence and the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in
the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.313
Kennedy also acknowledges a separate line of cases that impose two subsets of
categorical rules for the Eighth Amendment, including: (1) the nature of the offense, or (2) the
characteristics of the offender.314 Cases applying the “nature of offense” subset prohibit the
death penalty for non-homicide offenses.315 Similarly, cases applying the “characteristics of the
offender” subset prohibit the death penalty for individuals less than 18 years of age or who lack

308

See id. 58; see also U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
See id. at 58.
310 See id. at 59.
311 See id.
312 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (emphasis added).
313 See id. 60 (acknowledging that the Court has upheld life sentences without parole for non -violent felonies. For
example, the Court has upheld a sentence of 25 years for defendant’s third offense of stealing golf clubs and upheld
a life sentence with a possibility of parole for defendant’s third non-violent felony of obtaining money by false
pretenses).
314 See id. at 61-62 (acknowledging that these cases predominantly analyze the imposition of the death penalty, no t
life sentences without parole).
315 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, as modified (Oct. 1, 2008), opinion modified on denial of reh’g, 554
U.S. 945 (2008) (prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty for crime of rape of child when death of the victim
was not the intended result).
309
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the requisite intellectual capacity.316 Kennedy asserts that the categorical approach envisions
that the Court will exercise its own judgment by applying objective indicia of society’s
standards.317 Kennedy asserts that the categorical approach is applicable in Graham.318
Considering all objective indicia of society’s standards, the Court held a life sentence without
parole constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.319
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a concurring opinion. Roberts accuses the Court of
attempting to “invent a new constitutional rule of dubious provenance” to justify the ruling.320
Roberts reaches the same result, but founded on two separate principles: (1) the “narrowly
proportionality” standard and (2) judicial precedent set forth in Roper v. Simmons, which gives
significant weight to the culpability of juvenile offenders.321
The standard of “narrowly proportionality” directs a court to apply a case-by-case
analysis of the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty, keeping in mind that a
court does not possess absolute power to “second-guess” the decisions of the state legislature or
sentencing court.322 Roberts disagrees with Kennedy’s application of the proportionality
standard.323 Roberts clarifies that the court’s threshold inquiry should begin with a comparison
between the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty, considering all relevant
316 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting the imposition of death penalty for individuals younger

than 18 years old); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (prohibiting imposition of death penalty for individual
with low functioning intellectual capacity).
317 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 61 (objective indicia of society’s standards include national consensus, judicial
precedent, and the Eighth Amendment’s text, purpose, history, and meaning).
318 See id. at 61.
319 See id. at 67, 68, 71-74, 79, 81 (considering several factors, including: (1) that rarity of sentence showed a
national consensus opposing the sentence; (2) juvenile offenders lacked diminished moral culpability, particularly in
non-violent crimes; (3) a life sentence without parole constituted a particularly harsh punishment for a juvenile, who
will spend more time in prison than an adult sentenced the same; (4) reasons for incarceration, including retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation are not served by sentence and will provide little substantive benefit to
juvenile; (5) the offender’s age and lack of maturity; and (6) global opposition to sentence).
320 See id. at 86 (Roberts, J. concurring).
321 See id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)).
322 See id. at 88 (explaining that “narrowly proportionality” standard envisions that state legislature or sentencing
court decisions will rarely succumb to constitutional challenges ).
323 See id.
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factors including mental state and motive.324 Roberts asserts that if, and only if, an inference that
the punishment is “grossly disproportionate” arises from this threshold inquiry, can the court
proceed with intra- and inter-jurisdictional comparisons.325
Furthermore, Roberts’ asserts that the majority unwisely creates a new constitutional rule
– that a sentence of life without parole imposed on any juvenile for any non-homicide offense is
unconstitutional.326 Roberts cautions that the Court’s rule completely undermines the case-bycase analysis required by existing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and is unsuited for cases in
which the juvenile commits far more heinous non-homicide crimes.327 “[T]he whole enterprise
of proportionality review”, Roberts explains, “is premised on the ‘justified’ assumption that
‘courts are competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative scale’”. 328
Moreover, Roberts stresses the applicability of Roper v. Simmons to justify a less severe
sentence for Graham and juveniles similarly situated.329 Roberts rebuts the Court’s interpretation
of Roper as outright banning the imposition of a life sentence without parole on juveniles for
non-homicide crimes. Conversely, Roberts interprets Roper as standing for the proposition that
juveniles may receive such sentences so long as these sentences are “less severe than death”. 330
Roberts stresses that the true benefit of Roper is its emphasis of the offender’s juvenile status as
central to the inquiry of what constitutes a proportional punishment.331 Roberts finds that
because Graham’s youth contributed to his reckless behavior and criminal activity as well as his
324

See id.
See id.
326 See id. at 94.
327 See id. at 95.
328 See id. at 96.
329 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 569-70 (declaring death penalty for juveniles cruel and unusual punishments
and articulating three differences between juveniles and adults that demonstrate that juveniles have diminished
moral capacities and cannot reliably be classified among the “worst offenders”, including: (1) “lack of maturity and
an underdeveloped sense of responsibility”; (2) greater susceptibility to “negative influences and outside pressures”;
and (3) a developing character.)
330 See Graham, 553 U.S. at 90.
331 Id. at 90.
325
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enhanced susceptibility to peer pressure, Graham was markedly less culpable than a typical adult
who commits the same offenses.332
Because there is a strong inference that Graham’s life sentence without parole was
grossly disproportionate to his criminal activity, Roberts proceeds to intra- and interjurisdictional comparisons.333 By analyzing Florida’s sentencing statistics, Roberts agrees with
the majority that Florida is an outlier in its willingness to impose a life sentence without parole
on juveniles for non-homicide offenses.334 Roberts concludes that Graham received a much
harsher sentence than other juveniles. 335
iii.

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012) (Dissent)

In 2012, the Court reexamined Graham and ultimately extended the ruling of Graham to
include non-homicide as well as homicide crimes. The Court analyzed two consolidated cases,
Jackson v. Hobbs and Miller v. Alabama. Kuntrell Jackson was 14 when he and two other
teenagers went to a video store in Arkansas with the intent to rob it.

336

Jackson stayed outside

while the other two teens entered the store, pulled out a gun, and killed the store clerk.

337

Jackson was charged as an adult and given a life term without the possibility of parole. 338
Similarly, Evan Miller, a 14-year-old boy from Alabama, was convicted of murder after he and
another boy beat a 52-year-old neighbor in Alabama after the three had spent the evening

332

See id. at 91-92.
See id. at 93.
334 See id.
335 See id.
336 See Adam Liptak and Ethan Bronner, Justices Bar Mandatory Life Terms for Juveniles,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/26/us/justices -bar-mandatory-life-sentences-for-juveniles.html?hp&_r=0, June 25,
2012.
337 See id.
338 See David G. Savage, Supreme Court rules mandatory juvenile life without parole cruel and
unusual,http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/25/news/la-pn-supreme-court-rules-juvenile-life-without-parole-crueland-unusual-20120625, June 25, 2012.
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smoking marijuana and playing drinking games.339 The two youths then set fire to the
neighbor’s home, from which the neighbor died of smoke inhalation.340 Evan Miller was
charged as an adult and received a life sentence without the possibility of parole. 341
Justice Kagan wrote the majority opinion of the Court, which held that mandatory life
without parole for individuals under the age of 18 at the time of their crime constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 342 Justice Kagan asserts that
Graham v. Florida and Roper v. Simmons collectively stand for the proposition that the concept
of proportionality rooted in the Eighth Amendment requires that courts give significant weight to
a juvenile’s “lessened culpability”, greater “capacity for change”, and enhanced susceptibility to
peer pressure.343 Therefore, Justice Kagan interprets Graham and Roper to prohibit imposition
of a state’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders without giving any consideration to their
status as children.344 Given their diminished culpability, juvenile offenders cannot be subject to
the same offenses that an adult would be subjected to, even in homicide crimes.345
Moreover, Kagan asserts that Graham, Roper, and its progeny envision that each child
receive individualized sentencing, which takes into account several factors, including a
juvenile’s personal background and upbringing.346 The Court’s repugnance for mandatory life
without parole for juvenile offenders is premised on the lack of consideration given to the
juvenile’s family and home environment or other realities that influence the juvenile’s violence

339

See id.
See id.
341 See Ala. Code § 12–15–34 (1977) (Alabama law required that Miller be tried as a juvenile, but permitted the
District Attorney to seek removal of Miller’s case to adult court).
342 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
343 See id. at 2463-64.
344 See id. at 2466.
345 See id.
346 See id. at 2467.
340
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and inclination for criminal activity.347 Kagan articulates that in accordance with Graham,
Ropper, and its progeny a sentencing judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider
mitigating factors prior to imposing the harshest sentences for juvenile offenders.

348

Therefore,

by mandating that a juvenile convicted of homicide receive a life sentence without parole,
regardless of their age, age-related characteristics, or the nature of their crimes, mandatory
sentencing schemes in Alabama and Arkansas violates the Eighth Amendment’s principle of
proportionality and ban on cruel and unusual punishment.349
Justice Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion. 350 Roberts acknowledges that while the
present case “presents grave and challenging questions of morality and social policy”, the
Court’s role “is to apply the law, not to answer such questions.”351 Roberts asserts that
controlling Eighth Amendment jurisprudence determining if a punishment is cruel and unusual
entails a threshold inquiry of the “objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in
legislative enactments and state practice”. 352 This threshold inquiry ascertains the “consensus”
among states in a given sentencing practice and indicates to the court if the sentencing practice at
issue has deviated from that consensus.353 As such, Roberts meticulously analyzes state
sentencing guidelines that have increasingly and more frequently used the life-without-parole
sentence as a means of preventing repeat offenses.354 Roberts finds that many state legislatures
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See id. at 2468-69.
See id. at 2473 (acknowledging that most states do not have separate penalty provisions for juvenile offenders.
Of the 29 jurisdictions mandating life without parole for children, more than half do so by virtue of generally
applicable penalty provisions, imposing the sentence without regard to age).
349 See id. at 2475.
350 Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito joined.
351 See id. at 2477 (Roberts, J. dissenting).
352 See id. at 2477-78 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 60; Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 422 (2008); Roper, 543
U.S. at 564).
353 See id.
354 See id. at 2479 (criticizing the majority’s argument that the reason for the sentence’s frequent use is due to its
statutorily mandated imposition).
348
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clearly see a need for the sentence and have intentionally amended their laws to provide for it.355
Roberts concludes that the objective evidence demonstrates that the consensus among states is to
formally require and frequently impose the life imprisonment without parole for homicide
offenses, regardless of age.356
Roberts concedes that while Eighth Amendment jurisprudence traditionally considers the
“evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”, standards of
decency does not constitute “leniency”.

357

Roberts clarifies the role of the Court, which is to

leave matters of decency to the national consensus among the states.358 Roberts criticizes the
Court’s reasoning because it effectively invalidates state and federal laws without any regard for
the consensus.359 Roberts disapproves of the Court’s rule of law as it undermines legislative
authority to impose sentencing guidelines and fails to define an outer limit.360
e. Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments
i.

Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)

In 2007, the Roberts Court tackled the issue of race and affirmative action. In Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, the Court analyzed two public school
programs, which used race as mechanism for assigning or transferring students to public
elementary and high schools in their school districts. Seattle School District No. 1 in
Washington voluntarily implemented a program, which assigned students to public high schools

355

See id. at 2480 (discussing how one legislature purposely amended their laws to include life -without-parole
sentences for homicide offenses post-Graham).
356 See id. at 2478.
357 See id.
358 See id. at 2478-79.
359 See id. at 2481 (arguing that Ropper and Graham specifically affirmed the legality of life-without-parole
sentences for juvenile offenses who commit homicides).
360 See id. at 2482.
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in the Seattle area based on familial relationships and race. 361 Pursuant to the program, incoming
high school students ranked their choice of school. 362 However, some of these schools,
specifically the Ballard School, were particularly popular among the incoming class. 363 The
program dictated that if too many students chose one particular school, the school board could
utilize certain “tiebreakers”, including race, to determine what schools these students should
attend.364 The program sought to racially integrate schools with a student population of more
than 51% white population.365 If an oversubscribed school was not within 10 percentage points
of the School District’s overall white and non-white racial balance, the District employed a
tiebreaker that ideally served to bring the school into racial balance. 366
Andy Meeks, an incoming freshman student, had been accepted into the Ballard School,
but was later denied admission and assigned to another high school as a result of the race
tiebreaker.367 His mother by and through Parents Involved in Community Schools (“Parents
Involved”), a nonprofit corporation comprised of parents of aggrieved children, initiated the
lawsuit against Seattle School District No. 1. 368
The Jefferson County School District in Louisiana implemented a similar program.369 In
contrast to Seattle, in 1973, a federal court mandated that Jefferson County desegregate its

See Coyle, supra. at 33-34, 36 (explaining that Seattle’s primary motivation to implement assignment plan was
due in part to School District’s housing patterns, which caused segregation in Seattle’s schools).
362 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 711 (2007).
363 See id. at 711 (From 2000-2001, 82% of the incoming high school class selected Ballard as well as three other
schools, including Nathan Hale, Roosevelt, Garfield, and Franklin, as their top choices. Balla rd, Nathan Hale, and
Roosevelt possessed a white population that exceeded 51% of the total student population).
364 See id. (The first tiebreaker provided that school board selected for admission students who have a sibling
currently enrolled in the chosen school. The second tiebreaker considered the racial composition of the school and
the race of each individual student. Finally, if familial relations and race were not sufficient tiebreakers, the school
board considered geographic proximity to each high school).
365 See id.
366 See id.
367 See id. at 714.
368 See id.
369 See id. at 715.
361
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schools.370 By 2000, a federal court deemed Jefferson County to have fulfilled its court mandate
to desegregate.371 Nevertheless, in 2001, Jefferson County voluntarily implemented an
assignment plan, which assigned children to elementary schools and assessed school transfer
requests based on race.372 Jefferson County’s program required all non-magnet schools to
maintain a minimum black enrollment of 15 percent and a maximum black enrollment of 50
percent.373 Pursuant to the assignment plan, parents of kindergartners, first graders, and students
new to the district could submit applications indicating a first and second choice among the
schools within their geographic cluster. 374 The district would not assign a student to a school if
he or she would contribute to the overall racial imbalance at the school. 375 Crystal Meredith, a
Louisville parent, initiated the lawsuit against Jefferson County because her son could not attend
the kindergarten closest to their home. 376
The Seattle and Jefferson County cases were consolidated prior to Supreme Court
review.377 By 2007, the composition of the Supreme Court witnessed a significant change, as
Justices Roberts and Alito ascended to the bench.

378

370

This change created uncertainty and

See id.
See id. at 716.
372 See id. (At the time, approximately 34 percent of the Jefferson County’s 97,000 students were black while the
remaining 66 percent were white).
373 See id.
374 See id. (Jefferson County’s assignment plan gave significant weight to geographic loc ation and racial makeup).
375 See id.
376 See Coyle, supra. at 29.
377 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 711; see Coyle, supra. at 59 (before seeking Supreme Court review, the Sixth
Circuit held that Jefferson County’s school board met its burden to establish a compelling interest because it
articulated the reasons that the Supreme Court approved in Grutter and provided compelling interests and benefits of
its policy, including improved student education and community support for public schools. Additionally, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that the policy was narrowly tailored to this compelling interest, avoiding race in a predominant
and unnecessary way that could harm members of a particular racial group. The Ninth Circuit, applying the
reasoning in Grutter, held that Seattle had a compelling interest to secure the education and social benefits of racial
diversification and ameliorate racial isolation that has resulted from Seattle’s segregated housing patterns. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the school district’s right to assign its students to any one of its schools and held that the
program does not benefit any one particular race to the detriment of the other).
378 See Coyle, supra. at 88.
371

48

Katerina Mantell
Professor Wefing – U.S. Supreme Court
uneasiness among proponents of the assignment programs as the conservative beliefs of Roberts
and Alito were well known, but their take on race and affirmative action were not. 379
Roberts, writing for the majority, presented the fundamental issue: whether a public
school that had not operated legally segregated schools or has been found to be unitary may
choose to classify students by race and rely upon that classification in making school
assignments.380 Chief Justice Roberts stated that when the government distributes burdens or
benefits on the basis of race, the government’s actions are reviewed under strict scrutiny. 381 As
such, the Seattle and Louisville School Districts were required to demonstrate that the use of race
in their assignment plans were “narrowly tailored” to achieve a “compelling” government
interest.382 Roberts identified two judicially recognized compelling government interests:
remedying the effects of past discrimination, specifically segregation, and diversity in higher
education, as evidenced in Grutter v. Bollinger.383 Roberts found that Jefferson County, like
Seattle, did not implement its assignment plan for the purposes of remedying the effects of
intentional discrimination.384 Roberts asserts that the dissent misconstrues the applicability of
the remedial justification and completely overlooks the fact that Seattle was never deemed
segregated by law and Jefferson County eliminated all vestiges of its prior status.385
Next, Roberts addressed the looming issue of the Grutter and Gratz opinions. First and
foremost, Roberts iterates throughout his opinion that the specific interest found compelling in
Grutter was diversity among the student body in higher education institutions.386 Roberts argues

379

See id.
See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 711.
381 See id. at 720 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270
(2003)).
382 See id.
383 See id. at 720, 721 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003)).
384 See id.
385 See id. 736-37.
386 See id. 721, 725 (emphasis added).
380
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that the Court in Grutter “expressly articulated key limitations on its holding,” focusing on
broad-based diversity within the unique context of higher education. 387 Roberts critically points
out that the lower courts and the dissent disregarded the key limitations of Grutter, which did not
apply to public elementary or high schools such as Seattle and Jefferson County.388
Even so, Roberts compares the Seattle and Louisville assignment plans to that the
University of Michigan law’s school affirmative action program, which were upheld in Grutter.
Roberts argues that the diversity interest of the University of Michigan’s law school did not
focus on race alone.389 Roberts clarifies that the use of racial classifications in Grutter was part
of a broader assessment of diversity and not to a mechanism to achieve racial balance among the
incoming law school population.390 Roberts argues that Grutter stands for the proposition that a
plan premised solely on the basis of balancing races is unconstitutional. 391 Hence, Roberts
distinguishes Grutter from Parents Involved because the Seattle and Jefferson County
assignment plans did not consider race as part of a broader effort to achieve “exposure to widely
diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints”.392
Seattle and Jefferson County argued that, unlike Grutter, the districts instituted
assignment plans on the basis of race in the effort to directly promote racial diversity and not
broader diversity.393 As such, the Seattle’s tiebreaker plan and Louisville’s racial integration
plan furthered this intended purpose. Roberts rejects this argument. Rather, Roberts concludes
that such plans are not narrowly tailored to the goal of achieving the educational and social

387

See id. at 725 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327, 328, 334).
See id.
389 See id. at 722 (citing Grutter, supra. at 337)
390 See id. at 722.
391 See id. at 722-23.
392 See id. at 723 (citing Grutter, supra. at 330).
393 See id.
388
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benefits associated with racial diversity, but rather only seek to ensure numerical balance. 394
Roberts forewarned that to allow racial balancing as a compelling end in of itself would ensure
that it would forever be used, to initially obtain an appropriate mix of race and to continue the
existence of this appropriate mix.395 In conclusion, Roberts determines that the assignment plans
were more akin to the affirmative action program struck down in Gratz in that Seattle and
Jefferson County, like the University of Michigan’s undergraduate school, utilized race in a
mechanical non-individualized way.396
Roberts rejected supplemental arguments made by Seattle and Jefferson County. Seattle
contended that the use of race as a tiebreaker in its assignment plan reduced imbalanced racial
concentration in schools and ensured that racially concentrated housing patterns did not prevent
non-white students from accessing Seattle’s most desirable schools. 397 Similarly, Jefferson
County articulated a similar goal, which sought to educate its students in a racially integrated
environment.398 Roberts concluded that Seattle and Jefferson County failed to demonstrate that
their plans furthered these goals.399 Moreover, Roberts determined that the assignment plans had
minimal effect on minority populations, by only shifting a small number of students between
schools, and that any marginal changes in student population outweighed the cost of subjecting
students to disparate treatment based solely upon race. 400

394

See id. at 726, 727.
See id. at 730-31.
396 See id. at 724 (To illustrate this point, Roberts explains the inherent problems in Seattle’s assignment plan, which
classified students as white or non-white. Roberts adjudges that a high school with 50 percent Asian American
students and 50 percent white students but no African American, Native American, or Latino students qualified as
balanced, whereas a school with 30 percent Asian American, 25 percent African American, 25 percent Latino, and
20 percent white students would not).
397 See id. at 725.
398 See id.
399 See id. at 727 (In support of this, Roberts found that Seattle did not demonstrate how the educational and social
benefits of racial diversity were more likely achieved at a school that was 50 percent white and 50 percent Asian
American, which qualified as diverse under Seattle’s plan, than at a school that was 30 percent Asian American, 25
percent African American, 25 percent Latino, and 20 percent white).
400 See id. at 733.
395
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Roberts finalizes his opinion with an analysis of Brown v. Board of Education.401
Roberts contends that racial balancing undermines the fundamental principle of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth and its progeny of case law, which protects individuals, not
groups.402 Dividing individuals into racial groups promotes racial inferiority and endorses racebased reasoning and the conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs. 403 Roberts suggests
that Seattle and Jefferson County did exactly what Brown and its progeny prohibit, they used
race as a factor in affording educational opportunities to some groups and not others. 404 In the
final paragraph of his opinion, Roberts advocates that,
For schools that never segregated on the basis of race, such as Seattle, or
that have removed the vestiges of past segregation, such as Jefferson
County, the way ‘to achieve a system of determining admission to the
public schools on a nonracial basis,’ is to stop assigning students on a
racial basis. The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race.”405
Roberts insists that it is possible to eliminate racial discrimination within the nation’s schools by
simply ignoring race, or at least implementing policies that without any reference to race.406
ii.

United States v. Windsor (2013) (Dissent)

In May 1996, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”).407 Section 3 of
DOMA defined “marriage” for purposes of federal law as the “legal union between one man and
one woman as husband and wife”.408 Additionally, it defined a “spouse” as a “person of the

401

See id. at 742.
See id. at 746 (citing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I) for premise that group
classifications, no matter how benign, are inherently suspect and should be strictly prohibited ).
403 See id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294, 300-301 (1955) (Brown II)).
404 See id. at 747.
405 See id. (citations omitted).
406 See id.
407 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013).
408 See Definition of “Marriage” and “Spouse”, 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (2006).
402
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opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”409 Since DOMA did not recognize same-sex marriage
under federal law it effectively barred same-sex couples from receiving federal benefits.
In 2007, Edith Windsor married her long-time partner, Thea Spyer, in Toronto, Canada,
after a forty-year engagement.

410

Windsor and Spyer resided in New York at this time. New

York recognized same-sex marriage and gave Full Faith and Credit to marriages entered into in
other states or foreign jurisdictions. 411 In 2009, Spyer passed away. Unfortunately, DOMA
prevented the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) from treating Windsor as Spyer’s spouse under
federal law, costing her more than $363,000 thousand dollars in federal estate taxes.412 Shortly
thereafter, Windsor was referred to Roberta Kaplan, at the firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton
& Garrison, who previously challenged New York’s gay marriage ban. 413 The American Civil
Liberties Union later joined Kaplan in the Windsor case. 414
By 2010, sentiments regarding same-sex marriage had fundamentally changed. 415 The
Obama Administration announced that while it would continue to enforce the law, it would not
defend the law in court.416 Accordingly, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (“BLAG”)
mounted a defense of Section 3 when the Obama administration refused to do so. 417

409

See id.
See Peter Applebome, Reveling in Her Supreme Court Moment, NY Times, Dec. 10, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/nyregion/edith-windsor-gay-widow-revels-in-supreme -court-fight.html.
411 See id.
412 See id.
413 See id.
414 See id.
415 See John Schwartz, Gay Couples to Sue Over U.S. Marriage Law, NYTims.com, Nov. 8, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/us/09marriage.html?_r=0.
416 See Office of Attorney General, Statement of the Attorney General on Litigation Involving the Defense of
Marriage Act, U.S. Dept. of Justice Office of Press Release, Feb. 23, 2011, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statementattorney-general-litigation-involving-defense-marriage-act.
417 See Basil Katz, Defense of Marriage Act Unconstitutional: Judge, Reuters, June 6, 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/ 06/us -usa-gaymarriage-id USBRE8551JW20120606 (The United States
District Court for the District of New York held that Windsor should receive a refund for the federal estate taxes.
The Government did not challenge this ruling. As such, BLAG stepped in in defense of DOMA when the case
reached the Supreme Court; see also Decision, Windsor v. United States, F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
410
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Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion.418 Kennedy asserts, first and foremost, that
Section 3 of DOMA does not forbid individual states from enacting laws that recognize same-sex
marriage or providing state benefits to individuals in same-sex marriages.419 Kennedy criticizes
DOMA for departing from long-established precedent that affords individuals states the power to
define and regulate marriage and domestic relations and that guarantees that all incidents,
benefits, and obligations derived from marriage to be uniform within each state.420 Kennedy
contends that “[t]he State’s power in defining the marital relation is of central relevance…apart
from the principles of federalism”.421 Although Kennedy alludes to the principles of federalism,
he does not declare DOMA unconstitutional based upon those principles.
Instead, the Court’s ruling is predicated on the Fifth Amendment and the liberty interests
it protects.422 Kennedy discerns the true purpose and practical effect of DOMA: to impose a
“disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma” on same-sex couples.423 Kennedy finds
support of this contention in DOMA’s legislative history of enactment and text, which expressed
moral disapproval of homosexuality and pronounced a moral conviction that heterosexuality
comported with traditional morality. 424 Kennedy concludes that by creating two contradictory
marriage regimes DOMA deprives couples of the rights, responsibilities, and benefits under
federal law, including numerous federal regulations that control laws pertaining to social
security, healthcare, housing, taxes, criminal sanctions, copyright, veterans’ benefits, and

418

The Court did not address Section 2 of DOMA, which does not require states that do not recognize same -sex
marriage to give Full Faith and Credit to same-sex marriages entered into in other states. See Certain acts, records,
and proceedings and the effect thereof, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2013).
419 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
420 See id. at 2692.
421 See id.
422 See id. at 2693.
423 See id.
424 See id. at 2693 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 104–664, pp. 12–13 (1996)).
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bankruptcy protection.425 Kennedy argues that there is no legitimate government interest to deny
the class of same-sex couples protection of personhood, dignity, and equal protection of the
laws.426 Kennedy declares DOMA unconstitutional because it singles out a class of persons and
treats this class as less respected than others in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 427
In contrast, Roberts votes to uphold DOMA in a brief four-page dissent.428 Roberts
attacks Kennedy’s decision to declare DOMA unconstitutional on three fronts: (1) congressional
intent; (2) uniformity and stability; and (3) state’s rights and federalism. Roberts explains that in
1996 federal and state governments acted in unanimity in defining marriage and the class of
individuals entitled to the incidents, benefits, and obligations derived therefrom.429 “Interests in
uniformity and stability”, Roberts asserts, “amply justified” Congress’ decision to define
marriage as a union between one man and one woman. 430 Additionally, Roberts’ asserts that
because Congress’ intentions did not vary so greatly from the states, it is incorrect to claim that it
acted with malice or imposed a discriminatory law without a legitimate government interest. 431
Roberts “would not tar the political branches with the brush of bigotry” without a stronger
showing that Congress codified the definition with malice. 432
Furthermore, Roberts seeks to clarify an ambiguity that may arise from the majority’s
opinion. Roberts asserts that the decision does not decide nor constrict state power to define
marriage.433 While the majority’s decision to strike down DOMA relies heavily on state power

425

See id. at 2690.
See id. at 2696.
427 See id.
428 See id. (Roberts drafted a separate dissent on the constitutionality of DOMA, but joined Justice Scalia’s dissent
on standing and jurisdiction).
429 See id.
430 See id.
431 See id.
432 Id. at 2692 (Kennedy, J. opinion) (concluding that the H.R.Rep. No. 104–664, pp. 12–13 (1996) constitutes
“strong evidence of a law having the purpose and effect of disapproval of that class”).
433 See id. at 2697.
426
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to define marital relations, the constitutionality of that power will only come into play in future
cases about the constitutionality of state marriage definitions. 434 Therefore, the basic notions of
federalism authorize each state to define marriage in a way that is different from its neighbor. 435
Roberts does not interpret DOMA to infringe on that right. 436
PART III: ANALYSIS
a. Article I and Article II Federal Power
i.

Federal Power and Healthcare

When President Bush nominated John Roberts for the position of Chief Justice, Roberts
expressed the intent to continue his successors’ legacy. 437 However, Roberts’ judicial
philosophy is distinct from that of Rehnquist’s in that Roberts seeks to build a consensus among
his colleagues, who remain evenly split between two conflicting ideologies. The burdensome
task of creating consensus requires Roberts to diverge from a right-wing conservative ideology.
The Health Care Case exemplifies Roberts’ attempt to build a consensus among his
colleagues, but in accordance with his judicial philosophy. While Justice Roberts did not vote in
line with his conservative colleagues, his opinion consistently articulates a conservative theme of
restraint on federal power. Roberts sifts through years of American history to demonstrate the
consistency of this theme and the importance of adhering to it.438 This is not to suggest that if
historical, judicial, or legislative precedent existed to authorize such expansive federal powers
that Roberts would flatly reject it. Roberts concedes that “legislative novelty is not necessarily
fatal”, that “there is a first time for everything,” but this case did not warrant such novelty.439

434

See id.
See id.
436 See id.
437 See Baker, supra. at 2.
438 See Sebelius, 131 S.Ct. 2588 (referencing James Madison’s The Federalist No. 45, at 293, which envisions a
broad power of Congress to expand the nation’s economy , but imposes explicit limitations on this power).
439 See id. at 2586.
435
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As Chief Justice, Robert’s must police the limits of federal power and ensure that the
federal government plays by the rules. Sebelius in no way relegates the federal government to
state of austerity; it simply institutes a carefully considered, clearly articulated boundary line of
which this Court and future courts must consider. As the Umpire of the Court, Roberts called the
shots. Neither the plain language of the Constitution nor the most-far reaching judicial precedent
allowed the government to regulate what Roberts considers inactivity. Congress overstepped its
bounds. Congress struck out.
As leader and Umpire of the Court, Roberts is tasked with providing a workable rule of
law that can be easily understood and applied consistently in the future. To illuminate the
importance of restraint on federal power, Roberts relies on a “slippery-slope” hypothetical, also
known as the “broccoli horrible”. In actuality, the “broccoli horrible” is most likely a
“hypothetical and unreal impossibility”.440 However, Roberts portrays the federal government as
a big brother-like state to emphasize the inevitable consequences of a court that fails to impose
an outer limit. The “broccoli horrible” constitutes a valid cautionary tale; a dramatization of
what could happen, even if highly unlikely.
Some have criticized Roberts for the Sebelius decision because he expressed utter disdain
for the mandate, yet he chose to save it.441 This criticism is misplaced for two reasons. First,
Roberts’ action to save the ACA in no way makes him a champion of the liberal front. By
labeling it a tax, in spite of Obama’s express statements to the contrary, Roberts circumvents the

See id. at 2591, 2625 (there is nothing in the Court’s jurisprudence or Sebelius to suggest that liberal or
conservative justices would permit such an invasion in the interests of the national economy or the Union); see also
Tribe, supra. at 65, 73; but see Let’s Move Initiative, Feb. 9, 2010, http://www.letsmove.gov/lear-facts/epidemicchildhood-obesity (Michelle Obama launched the Let’s Move Initiative, which implemented several programs to
manage and prevent child obesity and to provide healthier foods in the nation’s schools, ensure that every family has
access to healthy, affordable food, and promote greater physical activity); see also Tribe, supra. at 65, 73.
441 See Tribe, supra. at 56 (“The new law is nothing if not complex…Many of its provisions are s till being
interpreted and implemented, a process that will continue for years to come and affect virtually ever patient, doctor,
hospital, and branch of government.”).
440
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federal government’s intent to pass innovative social legislation and lumps the mandate in with
ordinary things that the Government taxes, including gasoline or earned income.442 Roberts
limited federal power where it could be most aggressive, i.e., the Commerce and the Necessary
Proper clauses. Additionally, by interpreting the mandate as a tax, Roberts places the burden on
the government to administer the tax, regulate transactions, and defend the ACA’s deficiencies.
Secondly, as Umpire, Roberts must call the shots fairly and objectively within the bounds
of the law and with deference to political and judicial institutions. Throughout his opinion,
Roberts acknowledges the necessity of insurance reform, but refused to expand Commerce and
Necessary and Proper clause powers any farther than the Court previously affixed. In order to
uphold this necessity, Roberts articulated a reasonable alternative and moderately broad federal
power, i.e., the taxing power. While Roberts effectively stripped the mandate of its regulatory
nature, he upheld the mandate with all of its provisions. As Umpire, Roberts allowed the federal
government a base run; it received judicial authority to regulate and administer the mandate in a
reasonable manner and within bounds of the Constitution and judicial precedent.
ii.

Federal Power and National Security

Moving back several years to 2004, the Roberts Court walked a delicate line in its
consideration of the Bush Administration’s War on Terror policies. The Court was stuck
between a rock and a hard place. The Constitution gave the President express powers to manage
war and military operations.443 However, Bush’s abuse of such expansive power could not
remain unchecked without some degree of judicial oversight.444

442

See Sebelius, 131 S.Ct. at 2594.
See U.S. Const. Art. II, § 8, Cl. 11.
444 See Coyle, supra. at 192; see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (O’Connor, J. majority) (reaffirming that war
does not give the President a blank check when it comes to the Nation’s citizens).
443
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President Bush nominated Roberts to the bench. Roberts also worked in the Solicitor
Attorney General’s Office during Bush Sr.’s administration.

445

Roberts has maintained close

affiliations with President Bush and the Republican Party. 446 Therefore, it seemed logical that
Roberts would vote in favor of the Bush Administration’s policies, granting extensive wartime
powers to both the President and Congress.
As the Umpire, Roberts fairly and objectively reviewed judicial precedent and analyzed
the statutory structure and legislative intent of the DTA and MCA. By surveying and adhering to
the Court’s recent precedent, Roberts recognizes that the Court provided the federal government
the legal basis to enact the DTA and MCA. Roberts is methodic in his legal analysis,
meticulously comparing each provision of the DTA and MCA to the preferred structures
described in Hamdi and its progeny.447 Roberts does not suggest that President Bush or
Congress should receive a blank check during wartime, but in the case of Boumediene, the
federal government hit a homerun.
The opinions of Roberts and Kennedy could not have been any more inapposite.
Kennedy composed an opinion that reflected his deep fascination with individual liberty and
constitutional structure.

448

He surveyed countless centuries of English and American history.

449

He then discussed the benefits of judicial intervention, with the judiciary acting as champion of
individual liberty as well as vindication for the federal government’s policies.450 In response,

445

See Tribe, supra. at 20.
This logic played out while Roberts sat on the D.C. Circuit. On July 15, 2005, the D.C. Circuit ruled and
unanimously held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that military commissions, approved and statutorily enacted by Congress,
constituted legitimate forums to try enemy combatants and that detainees could be tried before military commissions
prior to a determination of their prisoner of war status. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Decision of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, July 18, 2005.
447 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 787-92; see also Coyle, supra. at 195.
448 See Coyle, supra. at 198.
449 See id.
450 See id.
446
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Roberts confirms that such judicial activism is neither the role of the Court nor a fair, objective,
or legally sound precedent to make.
b. Analysis of First Amendment Rights
The Roberts Court faced tremendous criticism for its decision in Citizens United and
Bennett.451 Commentators suggested that the Roberts Court completely underestimated the
relative ease in which independent expenditures could coordinate activities of candidates so long
as they did not formally coordinate expenditures with candidates. 452 Additionally, some suggest
that the Court miscalculated the influence of independent expenditures and how such influence
can spawn the appearance of corruption even if a quid pro quo exchange does not take place.453
Because contemporary campaign finance jurisprudence interprets corruption to be tethered
tightly to quid pro quo corruption, such as the sale of public office, some argue that this
interpretation overlooks the effects of covert money in politics, which undermines the electoral
integrity and fosters public diffidence in the electoral process.454
These concerns may be valid, but they do not provide a workable rule for First
Amendment free speech rights. Citizens United and Bennett represent Roberts’ attempts to
Umpire a close game. The government came up to bat and championed adherence to the proAustin rationale, dictating that corporate wealth distorted open and public discussion of
campaign issues.455 In contrast, individual candidates and independent expenditure groups came
up to bat and advocated adherence to the pro-Buckley rationale, which provided First
451

See Tribe, supra. at 88-89.
Ibid. at 89.
453 See id. at 102.
454 See Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1563, 1603 (2012); Robert F.
Bauer, The Varieties of Corruption and the Problem of Appearance: A Response to Professor Samaha , 125 Harv. L.
Rev. F. 91, 94, 96 (2012) (citing Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248 (2006), which found that “the interests
underlying contribution limits, preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption, ‘directly implicate the
integrity of our electoral process.’ Yet that rationale does not simply mean ‘the lower the limit, the better.’”).
455 See Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate Spending Limit, New York Time, Jan. 21, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/politics/22scotus.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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Amendment protections regardless of corporate form. The government struck out. Roberts
defined and adhered to one rule of law: a campaign finance law premised on an equality interest
or an intent to level the electoral playing field between privately and publicly funded candidates
violate First Amendment rights. This rule of law targets what Roberts considered inconsistencies
in the Court’s jurisprudence.456
In our current political system, candidates are dependent on the people’s votes, but they
are also dependent upon those individuals or groups who have the means to fund a successful
campaign.457 The potential for untoward influences in the electoral process do not justify
limitations on such funding. Roberts recognizes the success of other mechanisms to control the
accumulation of wealth in the electoral marketplace, including disclosure and disclaimer
requirements as well as contribution limitations, that will not undermine the First Amendment’s
right to engage in free speech without unjustified government intrusion.458
c. Exceptions for Warrantless Search and Seizure under Fourth Amendment
The justices in Georgia v. Randolph strongly disagreed over the applicability of Fourth
Amendment precedent and the permissibility of creating an exception to this precedent. As the
Umpire, Roberts sought to build consensus around narrow opinions that adhered to preceding
third-party consent cases. Roberts sifted through earlier cases, considered their facts in light of
what was argued, discerned new trends, and clarified peculiar outcomes of the case. In sifting
through earlier cases, Roberts concluded that the Court lacked legal justification for evaluating
Randolph differently from preceding third-party consent cases. Roberts did not consider the

456

See Richard L. Hasen, Is "Dependence Corruption" Distinct from A Political Equality Argument for Campaign
Finance Laws? A Reply to Professor Lessig, 12 Election L.J. 305, 307 (2013) (arguing that Austin provided
Congress tremendous discretion to restrict speech by the news media and other widely recognized politically
motivated entities or groups and that such a bleak view of independent expenditure groups and privately funded
candidates did not justify leveling the playing field).
457 See Hasen, supra. at 309.
458 See Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2812.
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slight distinction in the facts of Randolph and these preceding cases to warrant an exception or a
new trend in the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.459
Roberts then ventured into the realm of hypotheticals to show the peculiar outcome of the
Court’s ruling. In Randolph, Roberts describes an incident where the police arrive at scene of
domestic violence. Scholarly critics suggest that Roberts’ discussion of domestic violence was
an “appeal to a kind of loaded imagery” and outside of the scope of Randolph, but these critics
impute facts to create a hypothetical situation Roberts’ never intended to create.460 The
imputation of facts into Roberts’ realistic scenario muddles his intent to show the peculiarity of
the majority’s reasoning. The Court affirmed, inter alio, that the Fourth Amendment affords the
“home” special protections from government intrusion.

461

In accordance with the Court’s

reasoning, “widely shared social expectations” and “customary social usage” would influence the
police to leave the alleged victim behind just because the other occupant, i.e., the abuser, tells
them to “stay out”.462 Thus, the Court safeguards the home at the expense of the abused spouse.
This hypothetical scenario realistically demonstrates the peculiarity the Randolph’s precedent.
In spite of the majority’s contentions, Roberts neither intended to decide Randolph on a
hypothetical scenario nor obstinately prohibit any exceptions to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. As Umpire, it is Roberts’ duty to build a consensus among the justices while
advancing narrow precedent to prevent future constitutional dissention or confusion.
459

As

See C. Dan Black, Georgia v. Randolph: A Murky Refinement of the Fourth Amendment Third -Party Consent
Doctrine, 42 Gonz. L. Rev. 321, 329-30 (2007) (Roberts affirmed that Rodriguez, Matlock , and Randolph were
factually similar in that defendants in these cases had an unjustified expectation of privacy and had assumed risk that
their co-occupants could allow entry of parties adverse to their interests, irrespective of defendant’s presence).
460 See Daniel Manne, Trouble at Home, 40 Rutgers L. Rec. 188, 213-14 (2013) (Imputing imagery of a wife
standing in the doorway with a “black eye” and claiming that Roberts’ appeal to his imaginary scenario “is nothing
more than a red herring” because the police in Randolph did not have probable cause to believe that any crime had
occurred. In contrast, in Roberts’ imaginary scenario, the police would have probable cause to believe that a crime,
i.e., domestic violence, occurred. Therefore, police entry in Roberts’ scenario would be premised on probable cause,
rather than co-occupant consent).
461 See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 511.
462 See id.
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Umpire, Roberts called the shots. He concluded that Scott Randolph should have struck out
because the Court diverged from judicial precedent and set forth an unworkable rule of law.463
d. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment
Roberts’ interpretation of the Eighth Amendment is predicated solely on existing judicial
precedent and evolving societal standards of a national consensus among states. As the Umpire,
Roberts fairly and objectively evaluates earlier cases, considers their factual distinctions in light
of what was argued, discerns new trends among the states, and clarifies any peculiar outcomes of
the case. The role of the Court and legislative power supports his determination that matters of
morality were not necessary to resolve the dispute at issue.

464

Baze v. Rees, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama represent the Roberts’ appeal to
narrow opinions, especially in cases that pose tremendous constitutional and legislative
implications. For example, in Graham v. Florida, Roberts employed his conservative,
minimalist philosophy to declare unconstitutional the mandatory imposition of life without
parole on Graham, not the sentence in of itself.465 Roberts agreed that Graham’s sentence
violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, but he advocated
for a ruling premised on strict application of the proportionality standard that considered the
particular defendant and particular crime at issue. He discerned a new trend based on the

463

See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1130 (2014) (reconsidering Randolph and holding that when an
objecting co-occupant present, but later removed from premises for objectively reasonable purposes, such as lawful
arrest, remaining occupant may validly consent to entry and search).
464 See Mary Berkheiser, Developmental Detour: How the Minimalism of Miller v. Alabama Led the Court's "Kids
Are Different" Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Down A Blind Alley, 46 Akron L. Rev. 489, 516 (2013).
465 See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 4, 8, 17-19 (1999)
(describing Justice Roberts's majority opinion in the health care law case as an exercise in “minimalis m and selfcontrol” that was a positive development for the law and the people).
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national consensus, but he did not agree that Graham’s case necessitated the creation of a new
legal precedent.466
Similarly, Roberts’ conservative and minimalist judicial philosophy fueled his dissent in
Miller, wherein he criticized the Court for straying from its narrowly tailored precedent and
disregarding the national consensus. Roberts details the peculiar outcome of the majority’s
decision, which in effect subjected 29 states to revision of sentencing procedures and
reconsideration of sentences for an estimated 5,000 juvenile inmates serving life without parole
for homicide offenses.467 This peculiar outcome could have been avoided had the Court not
strayed so far from the constraints of the law and widely accepted standards societal standards.
As Umpire, Roberts sets aside his personal views to devise a workable rule of law that
legislatures and the Court can use as a basis to avoid larger constitutional and moral issues.

468

Roberts was raised a devout Catholic and continues to actively practices his religion.469
However, Roberts prefers to keep that aspect of his life private, separate and apart from his
public role as judge.470 His devout Catholicism likely fostered his conservative ideologies, but
his role as Chief Justice is to call the shots fairly and objectively and without any reference to his
personal views. If the Chief Justice’s judicial philosophy expressed a moral or religious
preference, it would fundamentally undermine his role as the Umpire. Therefore, Roberts’
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence emphasizes the importance of existing precedent and a
national consensus among states to maintain uniformity, predictability, and impartiality in the
Court’s jurisprudence.

466

See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (concluding that the Court could have
resolved Graham’s case without establishing a new precedent, that a life sentence without parole was prohibited for
any juvenile for any non-homicide offense).
467 See Mary Berkheiser, supra. at 516.
468 See id. at 514-15.
469 See Purdum, supra. at 6.
470 See id.
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e. Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments
i.

Opinions Considering Race and the Fourteenth Amendment

The outcome of Parents Involved was especially significant for the Roberts Court as it
brought the landmark ruling of Brown v. Board of Education as well as affirmative action cases
to the forefront.471 The Court had never ruled on an affirmative action case where the aggrieved
parties challenged the voluntary use of race to achieve the benefits of diversity and to end racial
isolation in public elementary and high schools. 472 Rather, the Court continuously exercised its
authority to enforce Brown as many states repeatedly enacted policies that frustrated
desegregation or simply refused to take affirmative steps to desegregate public schools.473
Alternatively, prior to Parents Involved, the Court considered several affirmative action
programs implemented at high educational institutions, which set forth a threshold analysis for
determining the constitutionality of future programs.474

471

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (The Court held that state laws establishing separate public
schools for black and white students were unconstitutional, as these laws violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In the words of the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court, separate public educational
facilities were inherently unequal. Even if the state-operated segregated black and white schools were of equal
quality in facilities and teachers, segregation was inherently harmful to black students and in violat ion of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
472 See Coyle, supra. at 30.
473 Compare Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (holding that Virginia school board maintains an
affirmat ive duty to take whatever steps necessary to desegregate the unitary wh ite school system), Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1970) (upholding North Caro lina’s mandatory b using
policy as an appropriate remedy for the racial imbalance in its schools), Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189
(1973) (holding that while the Denver school imp lemented program that mandated or permitted racial segregation, it
instituted policies that man ifested and maintained racially and ethnically segregated schools), with Miliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (holding that boundary lines between 53 school districts in Detroit were not drawn
with the intent to racially segregate all d istricts and the effect of these boundary lines did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause).
474 Compare Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (striking down the admissions
policy of the University of California, Davis’ medical school, which reserved sixteen spots for minority students out
of the 100 students enrolled annually in the program, because the admissions policy was not absolutely necessary to
achieve the compelling goal of racial diversity, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking down admissions
policy of the University of Michigan’s undergraduate school for failing the heightened scrutiny test because the
policy automatically awarded 20 points to minority students without individually assessing each applicant), with
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the admissions policy of the University of Michigan’s law
school because the policy considered race as one of many factors, not the dominant factor, during the individual
assessment of each applicant).
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Roberts’ opinion on race is premised in part on his belief that the country is best served
by race neutral programs and that the country has evolved markedly since Brown v. Board of
Education. The dissent does not deny that the country has evolved, but it attributes such
evolution to affirmative action programs. 475 The plurality and the dissent diverge on how the
Seattle and Jefferson County programs brought about change in those school districts and
whether race was truly necessary to bring out those changes.476 The dissent clarifies what it
deems to be fallacies in the plurality opinion; specifically, that the implementation of affirmative
action or assignments plans that explicitly use racial criteria suggests that such criteria has an
important and necessary role to play in remedying the lingering effects of racial segregation.477
Parents Involved is difficult to rectify with Roberts’ childhood upbringing. Roberts
enjoyed the financial benefits of his father’s executive position at Bethlehem steel. However,
Roberts worked with lower class individuals in the steel mills, interacting with many individuals
whom would likely never attend college. 478 He witnessed firsthand that not everyone is born
with a silver spoon in their mouth or possess the intellectual prowess that Roberts possessed. For
this reason, Roberts’ race-neutral viewpoint does not stem from a disconnect with the common
man. Rather, it predicated on his interpretation of the law, his efforts to set an outer limit on
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, and his hope that the Country and the Court can
rise above the inequality that results from classifying based on race.

475

See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 860-61 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
See Coyle, supra. at 31 (For example, in 2000, Ballard’s racial composition consisted of 70-30 white to nonwhite students. By 2003, the school’s racial composition consisted of 57-43 white to non-white students); but see
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 724 (Roberts, J.) (discussing Seattle’s assignment plan and determining that white or
non-white differentiation lead to peculiar results).
477 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 860-61 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
478 See Purdum, supra. at 3.
476
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The plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment is race-neutral in that all incidents,
benefits, and obligations attributed by law must be applied to all individuals equally.
no mention of race, creed, or gender and in effect is colorblind.

480

479

It makes

Any practice, policy, or

program that affords benefits to one class of individuals, but not another violates the plain
language of the statute. Nevertheless, the Court has recognized several permissible exceptions to
this rule as a means of carrying out the Amendment’s intended purpose, which was to end statesponsored discrimination.481 The Constitution set the floor while existing Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence set the outer limit. The outer limit explicitly held that any program or
policy that considers race as the predominant factor in affording an individual incidents, benefits,
or obligations of such program or policy violates the Fourteenth Amendment. 482 Like Rehnquist,
Roberts adheres to a narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to ensure
that the Court and legislatures do not stray too far from that outer limit.
As Umpire, Roberts analyzes the Seattle and Jefferson County programs within this outer
limit.483 Roberts called the shots: the assignment plans exceeded the outer limit of existing
precedent as both plans considered race a predominant factor in an effort to obtain a specific
quota of a racial class. Seattle and Jefferson County struck out.
i.

Opinions Considering Fifth Amendment Protection of Marriage Rights

Roberts’ dissent in Windsor provides a very terse legal analysis. The brevity of Roberts’
opinion was likely influenced by his decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry.484 In Windsor, like

See U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1.
See id.; Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 772 (Thomas, J. concurring); but see Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 829
(Breyer, J. dissenting) (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880)).
481 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 753-54 (Roberts, J.) (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402
U.S. 1, 5-6 (U.S. 1971)).
482 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720, 723 (citing Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275).
483 See id.
484 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (declaring that the parties lacked standing because the only
individuals who sought to appeal were those official proponents who had intervened in the District Court, but the
479
480
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Hollingsworth, Justice Roberts dismissed the case for lack of standing and avoided the difficult
task of a ruling on its substantive merits.485
Roberts does not interpret Windsor or Hollingsworth to symbolize the Court’s approval
of same-sex marriage nationwide. Neither Windsor nor Hollingsworth set forth any judicial
precedent interpreting the extent of same-sex marriage rights under the Fourteenth or Fifth
Amendments. Rather, these cases simply codify the fine line between federal and state
governments and each governing body’s authority to define marriage in the realms in which they
govern.

486

This analysis falls squarely in line with Roberts’ judicial philosophy in that federal

and state institutions of government and their decisionmaking authority should be respected.
Roberts clarifies the Court’s role, which is to give deference to these institutions unless such
institutions overstep constitutional or judicial precedent. As Umpire, Roberts fairly and
objectively weighs DOMA’s legislative history, congressional intent at the time of its enactment,
and the national consensus among states to conclude that Congress and individual states lawfully
exercised their decisionmaking authority.487
Additionally, Roberts’ conservative and minimalist philosophy surfaces in Windsor. He
did not intend to decide any more than Windsor required. Federalism principles adequately

proponents had not been ordered to do or refrain from doing anything. Their only interest in appealing was to
uphold the constitutionality of generally applicable law. Roberts stated, “[a]s this Court has repeatedly held such a
‘generalized grievance’—no matter how sincere—is insufficient to confer standing.”).
485 See Maura Dolan, Judge Strikes Down Prop. 8, Allows Gay Marriage in California [Updated] ,
latimesblogs.com, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/08/prop8-gay-marriage.ht ml, Aug. 4, 2010 (The facts
of Hollingsworth are quite similar to that of Windsor. Like Edith Windsor, Kristin Perry and Sandra Stier, the
aggrieved parties in Hollingsworth, initiated a case against Los Angeles County court clerks and California officials
after Perry and Stier had been denied a marriage license because they were a same-sex couple. The aggrieved
parties brought suit in federal district court. The federal district court judge entered a decision in favor of Perry and
Stier, overturning Proposition 8 based on Due Process and Equal Protectio n Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The State of California did not appeal the decision. Instead, official proponents of Proposition 8 challenged it. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court’s decision. Proponents of Prop osition 8 appealed
the decision to the Supreme Court)
486 See Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2697 (Roberts, J. dissenting); see also Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2705 (Alito, J. dissenting).
487 See Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2696-97.
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resolved the matter at issue and as such, he declined to address the Fifth Amendment equal
protection argument.488
Nevertheless, by interpreting Windsor as a federalism issue, Roberts ignores an
inconsistency in the Court’s Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. Specifically, the Court has
continually failed to announce a standard of review with regards to due process or equal
protection claims in the context of sexual orientation. 489 Under a rational basis review, it is
unclear if a court would find irrational any reason proffered by a state for imposing a same-sex
marriage ban.490 This has significant implications for same-sex couples seeking protection under
the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses as lower courts are free to apply this any standard
of review to suit their ideological preferences.491 By shying away from the same-sex marriage
issue, Roberts permits lower courts to run amuck with his court’s jurisprudence, inserting a rule
of law and standard of review with no discernable outer limit. 492 As Umpire and leader of the
Court, Roberts should have clarified the plurality’s unclear articulation of a standard of review in
sexual orientation cases.493 By shying away from the issue now, the Umpire places the burden
on state legislatures to solve outstanding disputes.

488

494

See id.
See id.; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
490 Compare De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 662 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (citing Windsor and applying rational
basis test to strike down Texas’ ban on same-sex marriage), with Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 431
(M.D. Pa. 2014) (applying intermediate scrutiny and declaring unconstitutional Pennsylvania statute that banned
same-sex marriage and refused to afford Full Faith and Credit to same-marriages entered into in other states); see
also Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 289 Conn. 135, 160 (2008) (applying intermediate scrutiny), and Varnum
v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 880 (Iowa 2009) (applying intermediate scrutiny).
491 See Tiffany C. Graham, Rethinking Section Five: Deference, Direct Regulation, and Restoring Congressional
Authority to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 65 Rutgers L. Rev. 667, 697 (2013).
492 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 481 (9th Cir. 2014) (interpreting Windsor as
striking down DOMA by looking at the “essence” of the law, or its “design” and “purpose”, rather than considering
legitimate justifications for its implementation).
493 See Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2683-84.
494 See U.S. Depart. Of Labor Technical Release No. 2013-04, 2 (Sept. 18, 2013) (stating that “spouse” and
“marriage” include same-sex couples legally married in any state or foreign jurisdiction that recognizes such
marriages, but do not couples in domestic partnerships or civil unions); see also Rev. Rul. 2013-44 I.R.B. 432 (Oct.
28, 2013).
489
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CONCLUSION
Roberts holds firmly to his belief that his role is to act like the Umpire of the Court. He
consistently approaches each case in a methodical way, sifting through judicial precedent,
discerning new trends, and rectifying any inconsistencies in the Court’s legal or factual analysis.
With this methodical analysis, Roberts decides if the parties struck out, circled the bases, or hit a
homerun. While Roberts welcomes the creation of new precedent where warranted, he
consistently advocates for the principled and intelligible evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence.
Roberts’ respect for judicial precedent, his role as Chief Justice, and narrowly tailored opinions
marks Roberts’ tenure as the Umpire and leader of the Court.
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